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Abstract 
The need for advanced cyber security measures and strategies is attributed to modern 
sophistications of cyber-attacks and intense media attention when attacks and breaches 
occur.  In May 2014, a congressional report suggested that Americans used 
approximately 500 million Internet-capable devices at home, including, but not limited to 
Smartphones, tablets, and other Internet-connected devices, which run various unimpeded 
applications.  Owing to this high level of connectivity, our home environment is not 
immune to the cyber-attack paradigm; rather, the home has evolved to become one of the 
most influenced markets where the Internet of Things has had extensive surfaces, vectors 
for attacks, and unanswered security concerns.  Thus, the aim of the present research was 
to investigate behavioral heuristics of the Internet of Things by adopting an exploratory 
multiple case study approach.  A controlled Internet of Things ecosystem was constructed 
consisting of real-life data observed during a typical life cycle of initial configuration and 
average use.  The information obtained during the course of this study involved the 
systematic acquisition and analysis of Smart Home ecosystem link-layer protocol data 
units (PDUs).  The methodology employed during this study involved a recursive 
multiple case study evaluation of the Smart Home ecosystem data-link layer PDUs and 
aligned the case studies to the existing Intrusion Kill Chain design model.  The proposed 
solution emerging from the case studies builds the appropriate data collection template 
while concurrently developing a Security as a Service (SECaaS) capability to evaluate 
collected results.   
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT) Security, Internet of Everything (IoE), Smart 
Home Security, Smart Home Security Solutions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
As our world becomes increasingly interconnected, cyber security is expected to 
increase in prominence.  High prevalence of Internet-connected devices has rendered 
many individuals vulnerable to breaches due to cyber-attacks.  The latest generation of 
electronic devices labeled   	
 	 
  


    
Internet and this drive is promoted as a means of making life easier and more efficient for 
the device   
  
 
 ff 
ff  
  -off, as it 
exposes us to significant risks because personal data can be stolen or misappropriated, 
causing a multitude of problems for the device owner.  In particular, the rapid 
technological advances have not been matched with increased cyber security for the 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices.  The IoT security lag creates an imbalance between 
technology and available security to satisfy the demands of the current technology.  
Researchers in the field of IoT note that the current security applications do not consider 
the advancement of technology or new technology use (Demblewski, 2015).  Therefore, 
as the overall security framework lacks the capability to meet the current demand, 
millions of private and public individuals, as well as companies, are at risk of invasion or 
data theft.  Such breaches can have adverse financial, economic, and physical 
consequences.  The goal of security frameworks is to identify future security concerns as 
a means of ensuring that devices are consistently and adequately protected (Demblewski, 
2015).  In light of the rapidly increasing scope and severity of security threats, future 
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security structures and IoT security solutions need to be developed dynamically, so that 
they can evolve to respond to future changes and demands. 
Background 
Due to the misalignment between rapid technological advances and available 
security measures, cyberspace has gained national focus and has become increasingly 
insecure over the past twenty-five years (Mandt, 2015).  The chronic lack of security is 
attributed to the incongruence with which technological advancement are implemented 
into the devices and services and the corresponding security measures, allowing greater 
opportunities for attackers to take advantage of the resulting vulnerabilities.  Thus, 
despite the advancements in both technology and security, cybercriminals are still able to 
manipulate the available technology to meet their needs, resulting in a stalemate between 
    	 
             
breached, allowing attackers to take control of lateral and more secure systems.  
Attackers are also able to steal/misappropriate data, and cause a variety of damages, not 
only to the technology and all related components, but to the owner as well, through libel, 
slander, threats, loss of data, theft, and other risks.  In order to mitigate these risks, 
differing defensive strategies are being developed by cyberspace professionals.  These 
defensive measures are designed to meet the increases in technological vulnerabilities 
and influence the overall security posture of the emergent technologies.  The resulting 
efforts will make it harder for attackers to access the information within the technology as 
well as control the technology remotely through unauthorized access.  In these initiatives, 
particular emphasis has been given to cyber-threat intelligence.  This information 
suggests that knowledge must holistically align with the relevant technology's 
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functionality and its vulnerabilities, as well as viable means of protection.  However, 
efforts made in this domain have yet to yield desirable outcomes, due to the rapid pace of 
technological advancement (Mandt, 2015).  As a result, until technology and security 
advancements fully align, it is impossible to obtain accurate intelligence based on which 
vulnerabilities can be detected and evaluated. 
Smart technology is also immature, as the current trends in smart technology 
encompass rapid technological advances. Thus, although smart technology is used by 
many individuals, it has not yet become conventional and lacks prominent market 
presence.  However, smart technology use is expected to expand tremendously until 2020 
(R. Brown, 2015).  Although security measures are currently in place, they are not 
necessarily strong enough to withstand the constant onslaught of the data transmittal that 
occurs, with exponentially growing nodes always connecting to the Internet (R. Brown, 
2015).  This increased throughput and growing population of nodes suggest that greater 
opportunities will exponentially emerge with problems concerning the data organic to 
smart technology.  For example, data can be obtained intentionally or unintentionally 
without authorization.  Smart technological data can serve a more nefarious purpose, 
subsequently causing a myriad of problems for the data holder.  Therefore, it is necessary 
to ensure that consumers are aware of smart technology vulnerabilities and threats.  Being 
conscious of and resolving the vulnerabilities and threats related to smart technology can 
be beneficial in the effort to eliminate cyber-crime and reduce the number of cyber-
attacks on data comprehensively. 
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Problem Opportunity Statement 
Innovative trends in technology are common occurrence and help advance its 
usage.  For example, cell phones that were once large and clunky have been gradually 
redesigned as their usage became more prevalent, and are now small and compact.  The 
evolution of telephones has also seen similar trends.  As communications evolved beyond 
wired applications, cordless devices with much longer ranges became available, and 
many individuals now use the Internet rather than conventional telephone systems.  
Similarly, vehicles used to be powered by combustion engine and required frequent 
refueling at petrol stations.  Now, it is possible to purchase vehicles that utilize a hybrid 
of electricity and fuel, allowing the driver to travel further before having to refuel or 
recharge.  On a grander scale, not so long ago, it was impossible to fly across the country; 
yet, NASA has put a spaceship on the Moon.  Thus, limitations are being overcome with 
advances in science and technology, which are driven by the desire to meet new needs 
and new demands.  In the early 2000s, the Windows phone was in trend, to be replaced 
by Android, eventually leading to the iPhone.  In computers, it was once inconceivable 
that virtually everyone in the developed world would have a personal computer (PC), yet 
now most of us have a laptop, as well as a notebook, a netbook, and/or tablets.  As this 
trend shows, devices are getting smaller, faster, and smarter.  Most devices can now 
connect to the Internet without the use of a PC.  Amidst all these advancements, security 
requirements have also increased.  However, security improvements have not changed at 
an equally rapid pace to meet the needs of the technology users.  Therefore, smart 
technology presents increased opportunities for cyber-attacks due to the shortcomings of 
the currently available security measures.  In line with the above, the problem statement 
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for this study is that consumers are not necessarily aware of vulnerabilities associated 
with IoT devices despite regularly purchasing smart technology (King, 2015). 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory research was to investigate Smart 
Home technological vulnerabilities within a real life context of the IoT typical usage 
applications and to characterize this average usage in relation to acceptable and nefarious 
data behaviors.  The contrasted data behavior was subsequently used to illuminate 
anomalous data link traffic and payloads.  Finally, data was collected through measuring 
Smart Home technology communications in a controlled environment.  Current data 
shows that Smart Home technology owners are not aware of the dangers they face, nor 
are they cognizant of the extent to which the risks they face stem from ubiquitous 
technological vulnerabilities (Lemos, 2015).  The information obtained in this study 
involves the systematic acquisition and analysis of Smart Home ecosystem link-layer 
protocol data units (PDUs).   
Research Questions 
The present investigation focused on broadening consumer awareness of the 
security threats and privacy concerns associated with conventional Smart Home web-
enabled devices.  Thus, as a part of this study, information pertaining to the background 
of security threats concerning Smart Home technology was obtained through extensive 
literature review.  Therefore, the research questions (RQs) were developed in the context 
of propositions and were aligned to explore Smart Home technology vulnerabilities and 
threats.  Based on the background information, the following research questions were 
developed: 
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RQ1.  How secure are Smart Home technology IoT systems, independently? 
RQ2.  What behavioral data exchange or aggregate device communication occurs 
between Smart Home objects that effect fundamental security levels? 
RQ3.  What are the emergent security issues related to Smart Home object 
behavior that affects personal safety relating to cyber security, resilience to cyber threats, 
and personally identifiable information from the collection of object usage data? 
Propositions 
Based on the background information, problem opportunity statement, purpose 
statement, and research questions, the following propositions can help direct the 
qualitative focus of the research: 
1.    It is proposed that Smart Home technology IoT systems are secure only 
insofar as their owners enable security for these devices, as to be explored given the 
results of RQ1. 
2.    It is proposed that Smart Home ecosystem behavioral data exchanges and 
aggregate communications result in security vulnerabilities, as to be explored given the 
results of RQ2. 
3.    It is proposed that confidential information, personally identifiable 
information, and personal safety are inadequately protected in Smart Home ecosystems, 
as to be explored given the results of RQ3. 
Independent IoT Security.  RQ1 is formulated to focus on device-specific Smart 
Home technology IoT systems for discovering separate areas of vulnerabilities.  
Independent vulnerabilities stem from isolated devices that are subject to improper 
configurations, targeted attacks, and unintentional misnomers.  Activities of this nature 
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are often mitigated to an acceptable level through vendor specific remedies though 
untimely mitigations may pose a residual vulnerability.  
Behavioral Heuristics of Aggregated Devices.  RQ2 is formulated to focus on 
inter-device communications that pose vulnerabilities due to a lack of vendor standards.  
The time associated with remedies which combat aggregate device vulnerabilities is 
subject to the interests of proprietary market leaders.  To foundationally understand 
sound levels of communication security, vendors typically defer to international security 
standards to which products must adhere.  In this research area, it is established that 
residual vulnerabilities persist due to a lack of standards and/or noncompliance.  
Security of the IoT.  RQ3 is formulated to distinguish among three distinct 
security categories personal safety, personal cyber security, and personally identifiable 
information.  All three relate to the vulnerabilities at the intersection of the physical 
domain, the Internet domain, and the Smart Home technology domain (see Figure 1).  
Within each independent domain, the intersection depicts the device categories that 
emerge as capabilities shared between the adjacent domains.  For example, the single-
state devices reside at the intersection of the physical and the Smart Home technology 
domains, as these require physical proximity to Smart Home technology device to 
influence personal safety.  At the intersection between the physical and the Internet 
domains reside control platforms, which require external mitigations to address personal 
cyber security concerns.  Finally, multi-state devices with sensory data reside at the 
intersection of the Smart Home technology and the Internet domains, given that these 
require advanced external and internal mitigations to address personal cyber security, and 
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personally identifiable information security concerns.  Hence, the IoT capabilities emerge 
at the intersection of all three domains.  
Conceptual Framework 
Within organizations, IoT use is expected to increase.  Researchers and 
practitioners perceive IoT as an integrated global network with the constant transmission 
of information of connection-oriented devices (Boos, Guenter, Grote, & Kinder, 2013; 
Sundmaeker, Guillemin, Friess, & Woelfflé, 2010).  Therefore, the use of Smart Home 
technology is based on the constant transmittal of data via an integrated global 
ecosystem.  At the same time, threats and vulnerabilities implicit in Smart Home 
technologies can be examined through human control theories and field theories, which 
pertain to external and internal threats, respectively (Kalika, Pallud, & Elie-Dit-Cosaque, 
2011).  The conceptual framework adopted in the present study derives from theoretical 
perspectives.  The major components of this study are physical, the Internet, and Smart 
Home technology that, while distinct, also overlap.  For example, the physical domain 
overlaps with the Internet due to control platforms, as well as with Smart Home 
technology due to single-state devices.  At the same time, the Internet overlaps with 
Smart Home technology due to multi-state devices with sensory data.  Finally, physical, 
the Internet, and Smart Home technology domains overlap due to IoT, as shown in Figure 
1. 
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Table 1   
 
  	  
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    (Hutchins et 
al., 2011) 
 
Phase Description Case Study (CS) 
Reconnaissance 
 
Research, identification, and selection of targets, often 
represented as crawling Internet websites such as conference 
proceedings and mailing lists for email addresses, social 
relationships, or information on specific technologies. 
CS 1 
Weaponization Coupling a remote access trojan with an exploit into a 
deliverable payload, typically using an automated tool 
(weaponizer).  Increasingly, client application data files such as 
Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office 
documents serve as the weaponized deliverable. 
CS 1 
Delivery Transmission of the weapon to the targeted environment. CS 2 
Exploitation After the weapon is delivered to victim host, exploitation triggers 
intruders' code 
CS 2 
Installation Installation of a remote access trojan or backdoor on the victim 
system allows the adversary to maintain persistence inside the 
environment. 
CS 2 
Command & 
Control 
Typically, compromised hosts must beacon outbound to an 
Internet controller server to establish a C2 channel. 
CS 3 
Actions on 
Objectives 
Intruders take actions to achieve their original objectives and can 
pinpoint and access critical data 
CS 3 
Source: Hutchins et al. (2011) 
In the context of this study, the Intrusion Kill Chain personifies the anatomy of a cyber 
intrusion.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the case studies conducted as a part of this 
investigation sought to discover progressively phased indicators of a cyber intrusion.  
Reconnaissance phase activities are characterized as actor-driven efforts aimed at 
obtaining generalized information about a potential victim (Hutchins et al., 2011).  
Information gathering in the reconnaissance phase helps the attacker draw conclusions 
about the potential victim.  Conclusions are drawn to assist in determining whether the 
victim's technology in use is susceptible to specific attack vectors.  The weaponization 
phase occurs when the attacker customizes attack vectors to achieve desired results.  
Often, the customization includes the creation of highly specific functions (e.g., through 
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ruby or python) that force the victim's device to respond in a predetermined sequence.  In 
the delivery phase, the infrastructure is physically connecting the attacker (or attacker's 
architecture) to the victim (or victim's architecture) and transmits the weaponized 
function.  In this context, exploitation is defined as the successful manipulation of a 
particular vulnerability using the weaponized function.  In the installation phase that 
follows, the weaponized function calls secondary functions to implant instructions on the 
victim's device(s).  In such an event, infrastructure is established to create communication 
between the attacker and the victim, which can be linear or obfuscated (the command and 
control phase).  The final phase pertains to the actions the attacker desires to perform on 
the victim's device(s).  Depending on the attacker skill level, the actions that are executed 
in the objective phase may include sanitation of evidence that any intrusion occurred or 
may involve sustainment of access through custom encryption tactics. 
Assumptions/Biases 
As any study of this nature, this research is subject to some assumptions and 
biases.  Specifically, it is assumed that the researcher will remain objective when 
analyzing subjective data and will assign the same value to all data.  The equal data value 
consideration is assumed because of the need for consistency in analysis.  It is further 
assumed that the researcher will apply consistent methodology when collecting and 
analyzing the data.  This assumption is a necessary prerequisite for all ubiquitous devices.  
It is also assumed that the use of Smart Home technology will become more prevalent in 
the future, making security for smart technology even more relevant.  The assumption of 
continued usage of Smart Home technology and consistent market growth is pertinent to 
the rate of technology advancement and expectations for security. 
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Significance of the Study 
The study is significant to both research and practice, as the results yielded reveal 
tertiary behavioral device susceptibility to vulnerabilities.  For example, the study 
findings assess and reveal the current level of smart technology vulnerabilities.  
Consumers and manufacturers can incorporate the conclusions from this study to help 
build awareness and smart technology usage expectations.  Moreover, those involved in 
developing security measures can respond to the current smart technology vulnerabilities 
   	
   	  	 
		
 the capabilities 
offered to users and adapting the security requirements to emergent smart technology can 
mitigate cyber-attacks while remaining consistent for consumer use. 
Delimitations 
In order to allow the study findings to be interpreted in the correct context, it is 
essential to state its delimitations explicitly.  In the present work, the researcher has 
elected to focus primarily on smart technology.  Restricting the study scope to Smart 
Home technology allowed addressing one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the 
technology industry and purchasing trends among technology consumers today.  In 
particular, the researcher has elected to include primarily smart technology that currently 
connects to the Internet.  This narrow focus in terms of the scope and types of technology 
considered in this study allows the investigation to concentrate on the knowledge of the 
existence of vulnerabilities relating to smart technology, thus responding to the current 
demands and trends within the industry.  Finally, this knowledge is assessed in relation to 
the degree of vulnerabilities inherent to smart technology systems. 
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Limitations 
Owing to the narrow scope of the present study, its findings cannot be generalized 
beyond the types of technologies examined in this work.  Thus, the results reported in this 
thesis will primarily be of value to those that own smart technology.  In addition, the 
researcher must remain aware that the research conducted does not apply to all smart 
technology users.  For instance, some individuals may be highly adept and 
knowledgeable about their technology, the risks associated, and the vulnerabilities.  On 
the other hand, some smart technology owners may have little to no awareness of risks 
and/or vulnerabilities.  Consumer knowledge level regarding the improvement of 
associated smart technology security levels can affect the applicable design of related 
Smart Home ecosystems.  However, without a nominal Smart Home ecosystem 
configuration, it is impossible to gain an accurate and generalizable view of the degree of 
Smart Home technology vulnerabilities. Thus, this variance of knowledge levels limits 
the ability of this study to generalize to Smart Home ecosystems beyond a nominal 
security configuration.  
Definition of Terms 
The following terms are frequently used in the thesis and are thus defined in the 
context of the present study: 
Smart Home ecosystem.  The term Smart Home pertains to a home predominately 
controlled by technology and embedded sensors.  These sensors can be pre-programmed 
to ensure that certain activities within the home occur at a certain time (such as turning 
on/off an irrigation system, activating external lighting, or adjusting the thermostat).  
14 
 
Different devices typically connect the Smart Home to the Internet (Gartner & Gartner, 
2015). 
IoT (Internet of Things).  The IoT refers to the ubiquitous array of web-enabled 
devices that create parallel connection states (Griffin, 2014b). IoT generally provides web 
access to physical devices that would not typically connect to a logical network.   
IoE (Internet of Everything).  Similar to the IoT, the IoE refers to the connection 
of people, things, data, and processes (Cisco_INC., 2016). The IoE incorporates a broader 
concept of ubiquitous connectivity from the perspective of existing technology. IoE 
generally provides enhanced web access and capability to physical devices that would 
typically connect to a logical network.   
Cyber attack/cyber intrusion.  The essence of a cyber attack/cyber intrusion is 
based on a purposeful act of aggression whereby an entity develops a payload to breach a 
logical or trusted boundary.  Passing this threshold enables an aggressor to establish a 
presence in a trusted environment, allowing various actions to be performed in order to 
achieve a specific objective (Hutchins et al., 2011). 
Vulnerability.  In the science of computer security, a vulnerability is indicative of 
a flaw that allows an attacker to reduce a system's general state of security (J. Hughes & 
Cybenko, 2014). 
Threat.  Threats represent the intersection of three elements: a    
  	


   

               
capability and intent to exploit such flaw (J. Hughes & Cybenko, 2014). 
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General Overview of the Research Design 
As a part of the present study, a vulnerability test was performed, which 
incorporated the theoretical basis of how disparate manufactured systems interconnect. 
The vulnerability test assisted in meeting the research objectives.  In particular, the 
vulnerability tests pertained to various wireless sensor network (WSN) products, 
ubiquitous networks, and pervasive computing in the categories of appliances, 
Smartphones, multimedia systems, lighting, heating, and home alarm systems, as these 
elements are most pertinent in the systems considered within the Smart Home domain.  
Devices operating within the Smart Home domain either consume user data or traverse 
the construct of availability-based systems.  The case studies comprising this research 
were conducted in a controlled environment.  The first case study focused on counter-
reconnaissance efforts to enhance discovery of possible cyber intrusions relevant to an 
IoT network, as well as determine the propensity of cyber intrusions to implant into the 
IoT network.  The reconnaissance and discovery efforts helped determine how secure 
Smart Home technology IoT systems are independent of other connected devices.  The 
second case study focused on the effectiveness of a proposed Debian 7 based (open 
source Intrusion Detection Software (IDS)) solution.  Finally, the aim of the third case 
study was to explore the IoT object behavior as it applies to the handling of cyber 
security and safety, resilience to cyber-threats, and personally identifiable information.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
The present chapter, Chapter 1, served as the introduction to the study.  As was 
stated earlier, the aim of the present investigation was to determine cyber security in the 
IoT context and evaluate the current use of Smart Home technology.  Since Smart Home 
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technology is becoming more prevalent, it is necessary to dedicate greater efforts into 
maintaining and/or improving cyber security.  As a part of this introductory chapter, the 
research questions, propositions, limitations, assumptions, and bias were stated, before 
summarizing information pertinent to the remainder of the thesis.  Chapter 2 provides the 
literature review, focusing on extant studies discussing cyber-attacks, IoT and IoE threats, 
and vulnerabilities.  The methodology utilized for the study is discussed in Chapter 3, 
elaborating on the concepts behind the study design, thus allowing other researchers to 
replicate the current research in the future.  Chapter 4 provides the study results, which 
are discussed in relation to the pertinent literature.  The final chapter, Chapter 5, provides 
the conclusion to the study, while also offering recommendations for future activities. 
Summary of Chapter 1 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a brief overview of the cyber security 
background, including vulnerabilities, especially in relation to Smart Home technology.  
As a part of Chapter 1, security threats and privacy concerns inherent in common Smart 
Home web-enabled devices used by the consumer were also highlighted.  The IoT 
security lag creates an imbalance between technology and the ability of currently 
available security to satisfy the demands of current technology.  This incongruence leaves 
millions of private and public individuals and companies at risk of invasion or data theft.  
Yet, available evidence shows that most consumers are unaware of these vulnerabilities.  
Independent vulnerabilities stem from isolated devices that are subjected to improper 
configurations, targeted attacks, and unintentional misnomers often mitigated to an 
acceptable level through vendor specific remedies.  However, untimely mitigations may 
pose a residual vulnerability due to lack of vendor standards or noncompliance.  These 
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issues were the basis for forming the research questions and propositions, addressed in 
the remainder of this thesis.   
The IoT capabilities emerge from the vulnerabilities situated at the intersection of 
the physical domain, the Internet domain, and the Smart Home technology domain, with 
some inherent vulnerabilities pertinent to all three domains.  In this chapter, evidence was 
provided, confirming that Smart Home technology vulnerabilities exist.  Thus, Smart 
Home technology is not inherently prepared for potential cyber-attacks, and the common 
Smart Home technology system is only moderately secure. 
As a part of Chapter 1, study limitations, assumptions, and biases were outlined, 
as these allow interpretation of the findings reported later in this thesis.  The chapter's 
primary importance stems from the delineation of the basic framework for the study, as 
well as explicating its contribution to the growing field of research. 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the review of pertinent literature, focusing on the 
sources where personal cyber security in the context of the Internet of Everything (IoE) 
and the Internet of Things (IoT) are discussed.  The aim of the literature review is to 
identify the gaps in the current knowledge of cyber security, thus confirming the need for 
the present study, as well as validating further requirements to investigate and assess the 
possibility of cyber-crimes in the domain of Smart Home technology.  The discussions 
presented in Chapter 2 also highlight the distinction between threats and vulnerabilities, 
while providing the definition of the nature of both internal and external threats.  The 
CIA Triad is mentioned to establish the foundational work accomplished, which balances 
efforts for network security.  The IoE and the IoT are studied to understand the evolution 
of ubiquitous computing systems as they relate to the Smart Home ecosystem.  Cyber-
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crime protection and cyber-crime laws are considered to validate modern challenges as 
they relate to Smart Home technology vulnerabilities, while also being pertinent to 
resolving Smart Home technology vulnerabilities.  Finally, Chapter 2 closes with a 
general overview of the case study methodology and a summary of the literature review 
findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of the literature review presented, is to provide information regarding 
cyber security, the IoT, and Smart Homes.  The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
need for cyber security and provides insight regarding the vulnerabilities within the 
IoT/the IoE and associated cyber-crimes, including internal and external threats.  The 
chapter also includes a discussion relating to the challenges when cyber-crime warrants 
further investigations and legal assessments.  The literature reviewed in the sections that 
follow explore the sources that build fundamental cyber security focus, such as the CIA 
Triad, cyber-crime protection mechanisms, and cyber-crime laws.  The different types of 
Smart Home technology are discussed as well, along with their default vulnerabilities and 
strategies that can be adopted to resolve them.  The chapter closes with a discussion of 
the chosen research strategy and a summary of the key points. 
The Need for Cyber Security 
Due to rapid advancements in technology, the need for advanced cyber security 
has increased dramatically over the last few years, owing to the widespread Internet 
broadband availability and decreased computing component cost (Mohn, 2015).  In 
October 2015, AT&T reported that, in comparison to 2013, 2014 AT&T networks 
realized a 62% increase in malicious scanning activity and a 458% increase in 
vulnerability scans of IoT devices (Krause, 2015).  The need for advanced cyber security 
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is partly attributed to the sophistication of cyber-attacks and intense media attention when 
attacks and breaches do occur (Dunn Cavelty, 2014).  The growing need for advanced 
cyber security is also related to increased attacker structure and organization when 
executing cyber intrusions.  As a result, cyber-attacks are more costly and much more 
detrimental to the victims.  For example, numerous cyber-attacks have been attempted on 
     	 
 	tional security, rendering the country vulnerable to domestic and 
international terrorist threats (Dunn Cavelty, 2014).  Other common targets for cyber-
attacks include organizations that use, consume, and store sensitive data.  Although 
databases with this type of information are primarily employed in the governmental 
sector, many are also developed and maintained within the private sector (Bamrara, 
2015). 
According to Joseph Swedish, President, and CEO of Anthem Inc., a large 
insurance company, in 2014, a sophisticated cyber-attack on Anthem Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield affected the private information of approximately 80 million individuals 
(Swedish, 2015).  The cyber-attack compromised current and former members, as their 
names, birthdays, medical IDs/social security numbers, street addresses, email addresses, 
and employment information were unlawfully obtained, along with their detailed income 
data (Swedish, 2015).  However, the breach was not reported until early February 2015.  
According to the reported findings, the cyber-attacks were carried out through stealing 
the credentials of Anthem employees, which was obtained through a widespread phishing 
fraud (Balbi, 2015).  During the conduct of the breach, personal identifying information 
was stolen, putting millions at risk of identity theft.  Significantly, the Anthem breach 
was the largest breach reported to date by a healthcare company (Balbi, 2015). 
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Healthcare companies are not the only targets of sophisticated cyber-attacks.  
Existing public records proved that cyber-attacks also target large retail companies.  For 
example, in December 2013, Target proved to be vulnerable to sophisticated exploits 
when the retailer was the victim of two separate cyber-attacks (Weiss & Miller, 2015).  
The first attack occurred when financial data pertaining to approximately 40 million 
credit and debit card account numbers were stolen.  Less than a month later, in January 
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been stolen.  The company also estimated that approximately 70 million individuals 
could be potential victims (Weiss & Miller, 2015).  In October 2015, Target reported that 
the two data breaches incurred losses of about $248 billion.  It is particularly noteworthy 
that the reported costs were not entirely inclusive.  A congressional research service 
conducted by Weiss and Miller indicated that these costs did not include estimated losses 
due to a subsequent decline in consumer confidence regarding the handling of their 
personal data, nor do these costs account for any potential malice, such as damages 
incurred to consumer credit history (Weiss & Miller, 2015).  Finally, the costs related to 
the Target data breach excluded penalties and/or fines levied by the government (Weiss 
& Miller, 2015).  Significantly, this particular breach has been publicized as one of the 
largest in the history of the United States.  As a result, consumers are increasingly 
concerned, given the size of the data breach (Weiss & Miller, 2015). 
Other concerns relate to the critical infrastructure of the United States.  In 2009, 
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 (R. Hughes, 2010).  Furthermore, it is 
anticipated that future wars will take place in cyberspace, which has emerged as a new 
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battlefield, allowing enemies to attack from any location at any time.  Unfortunately, 
while cyber warfare is gaining in popularity among those aiming to cause harm, public 
awareness of its extent and devastating consequences are limited.  According to R. 
Hughes (2010), cyber war will be executed through unique cyber-weaponry that will 
evolve through generations, as will cyber warfare tactics and applications.  The author 
also noted that terrorist groups commonly use attack vectors that maximize damage and 
avoids directly engaging a formidable adversary. 
Cyber-Crime Protection and Laws 
Cyber security is not merely a technical issue, but rather involves many diverse 
legal aspects and frameworks.  Therefore, it is necessary for developed countries to assist 
developing countries in the establishment of strong protections related to cyber-crime 
(ITU, 2014).  At the end of 2006, there were approximately 19 substantive cyber-crime 
laws and three procedural cyber-crime laws enacted within the United States (Rees, 
2006).  However, as of 2013, 28 revisions were recommended for laws governing actions 
attributed to cyber-crimes, or those specifically created to address cyber-crimes (Fischer, 
2013).  Cyber-crime laws are necessary for a variety of reasons, predating the Internet, 
and serving many different purposes.  However, many laws require revision in order to 
respond to the rapidly changing circumstances.  In particular, amendments and 
modifications are expected to persist in the future in order to accommodate cyber-crime 
due to the strong relationship between cyber-crime and social ties.  One significant form 
of cyber-crime, relating to society, is phishing.  For example, many phishers are part of 
an organized group, suggesting that this is becoming organized crime.  Available 
evidence also indicates that organized phisher groups are involved in real-world 
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relationships through social networks, rather than being members of Internet forums.  
Moreover, they focus on the use of social engineering, in contrast to malware, to acquire 
unauthorized information (Leukfeldt, 2014). 
Additionally, there is a growing need for cyber security measures.  According to a 
study conducted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), information 
technology systems and the development of Internet services are directly related to cyber 
security (ITU, 2014).  Consequently, for enhancements in cyber security to occur, critical 
information infrastructures must be protected to increase national security and economic 
well-being (ITU, 2014).  Moreover, to make the Internet safer, it is necessary to align 
new services and capabilities with government policies (ITU, 2014).  Owing to the 
complexity of cyber-crime, appropriate deterrents are integral to national cyber security 
and strategies related to protecting the critical information structure.  Based on these 
needs, it is conceivable that cyber security laws can continue to advance proportionally 
with technology and vulnerabilities (ITU, 2014). 
Challenges to Investigating and Assessing Cyber-Crime 
The seriousness of cyber-crimes and cyber terrorism is widely recognized.  
Furthermore, there is a growing consensus that everyone in every sector both public 
and private is affected in some way (Hyman, 2013).  Although nations have dedicated 
significant funds to cyber protection measures, the extent of damage imposed by cyber 
criminals is difficult to estimate (Hyman, 2013).  In addition, no quantifiable metrics 
presently exist to account for potential cyber-crimes and cyber terrorism attacks that will 
emerge in the future.  According to a study conducted by Symantec Corporation (Hyman, 
2013), cyber-crime is estimated to incur $110 billion in costs per year.  Yet, McAfee 
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Incorporation estimated that the actual impact is closer to $1 trillion (Hyman, 2013).  
Experts at McAfee stated that their assessment was based on financial losses through 
both malicious and accidental infringement on security (Hyman, 2013).  However, 
McAfee also agreed that there is no definitive way to measure every aspect of data loss. 
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degrades consumer trust, thus, representing one of the most difficult costs to estimate 
(Hyman, 2013).  Irrespective of the type of loss, the disparity between the estimates 
provided by the two organizations is significant, suggesting the presence of inexplicable 
barriers to accurate reporting. 
In many cases, companies victimized by cyber-crime decide not to report the 
breach for a variety of reasons, the perceived adverse impact on business operations 
being the most likely one (Hyman, 2013).  Other inhibitions involve reluctance to report 
the crime to the police.  A study conducted by Ernst and Young in 2003 indicated that 
merely one-quarter of all potential frauds was reported to law enforcement agencies.  The 
survey findings also revealed that only 28% of respondents were satisfied with the 
investigation results (J. Smith, 2003; R. G. Smith, 2003).  In Australia, for example, the 
following factors were identified as the main inhibitors to reporting cyber-crime to 
police: 
 A belief that the breach was minor and not worthy of police attention  

 Concerns regarding potential backlash from consumers  
 Concerns related to negative publicity;  
 Lack of credible (or any) proof 
 Reluctance to prosecute 
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Other contributing factors were fears of business loss due to electronic systems being 
down during repairs to security (R. G. Smith, 2003).  In some cases, jurisdiction issues 
impeded the cyber-crime investigation and prosecution of perpetrators.  For instance, the 
Internet provides a platform for international cyber-crime to occur, as the widespread 
interconnectivity allows the victim to reside in one country while the perpetrator is in 
another country (R. G. Smith, 2003).  Jurisdiction also affects prosecution success, as it 
introduces unique barriers to logistics and practicalities.  For instance, time zone 
differences often make investigations inconvenient for at least one party involved in 
investigative activities (R. G. Smith, 2003).  Similarly, the need for multilingual 
translation and interpreters could incur substantial costs, and given that such activities 
can be time-consuming, they hamper investigation progress.  The priorities assigned to 
different types of crime can also pose a significant barrier to the overall crime 
investigation.  For example, economic cyber-crimes are usually given lower priority 
relative to violent cyber-crimes (R. G. Smith, 2003).  Suspect attribution across an 
enfranchised domain presents significant issues as well.  R. G. Smith (2003) also 
demonstrated that identity concealment or misrepresentation of self could be conducted 
utilizing on-line technologies, such as proxies.  Identity concealment enables attributable 
identities to be easily stolen, allowing the e-commerce technologies with public key 
infrastructures and/or digital signatures to be manipulated (R. G. Smith, 2003).  This 
manipulation can be achieved through providing false documents, supporting alternative 
identities, rather than true identities.  Thus, with seemingly sound identification, it is 
possible for offenders to register and obtain the public-private key pair (a hallmark of 
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secure data transfer) using registration authority to access secure transactions (R. G. 
Smith, 2003). 
Threats and Vulnerabilities 
The quantity and complexity of advanced persistent threats (APT) or cyber-
attacks have dramatically increased in recent years.  An APT is a level of persistence in a 
computing system that allows an attacker at-will access regardless of security constraints 
(Messmer, 2011).  Thus, responding to such threats requires automated solutions that 
combat APT vulnerabilities in virtually every aspect of our lives.  A White House report 
released in May 2014 suggested that Americans used approximately 500 million Internet-
capable devices at home including, but not limited to, Smartphones, tablets, and other 
Internet-connected devices that run various unimpeded and parallel applications that 
connect to the web (Wheeler, 2014).  Given its high degree of connectivity to the external 
network, the Smart Home environment is not immune to the paradigm of an APT or 
cyber-attacks.  The home has evolved to become one of the most promising markets for 
new IoE/IoT developments.  It is envisaged that IoE/IoT will embrace technologies 
emerging in the field of pervasive computing and will offer extensive diversity as it 
pertains to the types of technology that converge to a single gateway in the home.  In 
2010, according to the FCC, 78% of Americans used the Internet, and 65% had 
broadband access at home (Horrigan, 2010).  Emergent IoE/IoT devices will sustain 
exponential growth, as more consumers are made aware of convenience capabilities 
offered by IoE devices in the home.  Consequently, the variety of IoE/IoT devices will 
eventually create a chasm of unanswered security concerns.  
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In May 2009, the White House Office of the Press Secretary explained the 
benefits and dangers of an increasingly connected ubiquitous network, thus highlighting 
cyber security as an essential aspect of the U.S. economy, national security interests, and 
the American Military prowess (Theohary & Rollins, 2009).  President Obama expressed 
his concern about the catastrophic effects that a relaxed approach to cyber security could 
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which the dynamics of terrorism can conceivably effect information networks (Theohary 
& Rollins, 2009).  In making this statement, the president is acknowledging the 
possibilities of cyber wars and cyber terrorism. 
Originally, the utility of control systems, such as those related to IoT security, was 
limited as their more widespread usage was prevented by the inadequate protocol 
knowledge by the public.  As a result, minimal efforts were made to enhance the security 
of the control system network, focusing on the physical measures instead (Fenrich, 2007, 
2008).  Today, this is no longer possible due to the sheer amount of data that is 
transmitted and stored in such systems, causing most control systems to become 
connected (always available for data transmission), rather than operating as stand-alone 
systems (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).  Yet, while advantageous, this connectivity increases 
vulnerabilities and threats.  Given that Smart Homes maintain continuous connectivity for 
home monitoring purposes, the programs required to provide this functionality share 
similar risks (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).  
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Control systems manufacturers have become aware of the vulnerabilities and 
threats they face (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).  This discovery prompted the responsible parties 
to enact different initiatives, which focused on increasing the awareness of the public in 
regards to the growing prevalence and extent of potential threats.  The added focus also 
meets the purpose of threat mitigating initiatives, e.g., establishing ways to reduce 
vulnerabilities through different mechanisms, including training programs, awareness and 
education, and the establishment of security priorities, thus reducing the potential 
onslaught of threats.  The initiatives towards vulnerability and threat mitigations confirm 
the growing awareness of the fact that issues of this nature can never be fully understood 
and resolved unless adequate knowledge of the risks imposed by control system usage 
and capabilities exists.  Thus, threats and vulnerabilities can be further categorized as 
internal and/or external (Fenrich, 2007, 2008). 
Internal Threats 
Internal threats can be classified as accidental or intentional, whereby the former 
occur due to a lack of knowledge or inattention (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).  Accidental threats 
are common to complex policies, operations, or lack of data confidentiality.  On the other 
hand, intentional threats are a result of intentional actions, such as data theft (Fenrich, 
2007, 2008). 
External Threats 
In the context of the present study, a web-enabled technology represents a 
physical product or a device-associated service that consumers use through, or in 
conjunction with, the World Wide Web (Jones & Schneier, 1995).  New web-enabled 
technology requires the establishment of a baseline level of network security resilience.  
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External threats arise from the use of malware, or activities of hackers and terrorists.  
Malware includes items such as spyware, trojans, viruses, and worms.  Malware attacks 
are usually indirect, suggesting that there is no blatant attack on the system, but rather a 
systematic attack or theft of information.  Typically, the goal of malware is to cause 
communication obstruction, data corruption, installation of backdoors for remote viewing 
and control, or forced shutdowns, all of which have a negative impact on information 
systems (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).  Hackers are commonly external entities interested in 
penetrating another system to gain information, intrude on privacy, or gain control of a 
system.  Terrorists, on the other hand, usually target the most critical infrastructure 
systems, especially those the targeted country requires for operation, such as electricity, 
water supply, traffic management, and a myriad of other categories of control systems.  
As a result, this particular threat is a major concern for those that maintain the critical 
infrastructures, such as governmental agencies and large corporate organizations.  The 
primary difference between hackers and terrorists is that terrorists focus on causing harm 
to people, whereas hackers aim to disrupt systems or obtain information. 
CIA Triad 
Establishing the aforementioned security baseline is a critical task that must be 
completed to meet the needs of consumers and manufacturers alike.  For instance, the 
CIA Triad (Data Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) is the basis for fundamental 
concepts regarding how technology manufacturers balance security for emerging web-
enabled technologies.  Furthermore, through the CIA Triad, the theoretical design model 
for balancing baseline network security is established (Ning, Liu, & Yang, 2013).  The 
model can be ascribed to several social theories because of the purpose of network 
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design.  For instance, most networks are used to allow a user faster access to the Internet, 
while increasing the capacity to accomplish disparate tasks.  Therefore, in order to allow 
technology to improve lives, technology developers must understand not only the 
associated technology but the people that use it as well (Kleine, 2015). 
During the 1980s, the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) was developed (Kleine, 
2015).  ANT theory focuses on socio-technical systems and the way they are represented 
as actor networks.  These actors include formal/informal processes, technology, and 
human actions to initiate and complete processes. In addition, for processes to function in 
the network, they must be involved in some relation with each other, indicating that all 
processes, technology, and human actions within the network exert a significant influence 
on one another (Kleine, 2015).  The ANT theory is particularly useful in relation to new 
software.  For example, ANT is helpful in analyzing new software user interface actions 
within networks relating to other actors, whereby it affects the ability of the network to 
enable or prevent actions taken by other actors (Kleine, 2015).  As a result, based on the 
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influence the result in a variety of ways. 
The Capability Approach (CA) is another relevant social theory because it 
describes development in more than economic terms.  Its application thus allows human 
development to have an influence on the design of products and technologies.  The co-
creator of this approach was the Nobel-prize winning economist Amartya Sen.  
According to Sen, development is based on the processes involved in establishing and/or 
expanding real freedoms enjoyed by people (Kleine, 2015).  This view suggests that 
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freedoms are not a prerequisite for a quality of life to be maintained.  Therefore, as an 
actively maintained quality of life is posited to enable people to have enhanced choices, 
this suggests a link between social theories and network design (Kleine, 2015).  The 
relevance of the CA theory to the technological advances is evident due to the ability of 
experts to trace the development processes and to examine the manner in which 
technology influences life.  As a result, social theories are useful in the design and 
development of technology because they are primarily based on a comprehensive socio-
technical analysis.  Social theories mostly focus on human needs and expectations, while 
also accounting for constraints imposed by the design.  This social theory analysis is 
useful for identifying design process challenges (Kleine, 2015). 
In order to adequately respond to the increasing number of threats and 
vulnerabilities, many organizations use the CIA Triad.  The CIA Triad model is the 
benchmark against which effectiveness of any given information systems security is 
measured, in terms of its ability to repel and detect emerging threats and vulnerabilities.  
Within the Triad, confidentiality focuses on data security and privacy; integrity pertains 
to maintaining data in its current form, and availability relates to ensuring that the data is 
provided to and/or is easily obtained by those that need the data (Fenrich, 2007, 2008). 
Control systems, as well as Smart Home technologies, utilize the CIA Triad, 
albeit in reverse order.  In this case, availability and integrity are of higher importance 
than confidentiality.  A higher emphasis is placed on availability because the system must 
always be usable.  At the same time, it is assumed that Smart Home technology does not 
typically have much, if any, sensitive data.  Due to the reverse nature of the CIA Triad in 
this situation, additional issues can arise.  Moreover, when Smart Home technology 
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devices aggregate, the potential exists to perpetuate an environment of highly volatile 
network vulnerabilities.  These diverse network vulnerabilities enable a growing surface 
upon which a fundamentally different age of cyber security emerges (Roberts, 2014).  
Now, more than ever, the need for continual testing and patching for vulnerabilities in 
emerging technologies has become paramount (Protalinski, 2014). 
The Internet of Everything (IoE) and the Internet of Things (IoT) 
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greater automation, error reduction, and efficiency improvements, was first introduced in 
2000 by the founders of the MIT Auto-ID Center (Gérald, 2010; Sundmaeker et al., 
2010).  At the time, IoT technologies encompassed simple technologies, e.g., bar codes, 
smart cards, sensors, voice recognition, biometrics, and since 2003, Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) (Gérald, 2010; Sundmaeker et al., 2010).  In September 2003, the 
Auto-ID Center officially launched the concept of the EPC (Electronic Product Code) 
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introduced a technology infrastructure that served as a tracking mechanism for computers 
to automatically identify man-made objects while encompassing an entire logistical 
lifecycle, from plant to distribution centers (Gérald, 2010; Sundmaeker et al., 2010).  The 
Symposium attendees concurred with the view that RFID would become a key enabling 
technology for economic growth for the next fifty years, inciting a fundamental shift from 
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et al., 2010). 
IoE and IoT are related to interconnectivity and device intelligence.  IoE and IoT 
will grow in prominence, as future sensory technology will more commonly support IoE 
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and IoT use case applications.  Furthermore, these sensors would be smaller and serve 
multiple purposes (Noor, 2015).  Thus, devices would be more intelligent through deep 
learning, which is a process that consists of using algorithms designed to allow 
experience and observations to teach machines.  Therefore, it is envisaged that IoE, IoT, 
and interconnectivity will influence all aspects of daily life.  In the business industry, IoE 
and IoT will be responsible for improved productivity, innovation, and/or economic 
opportunities, due to lower costs, higher efficiency, and autonomous engagement (Noor, 
2015).  Overall, through IoE and IoT, connections will be made between people and 
things, transforming heterogeneous data into data that can be used to assist in creating 
new ways of completing previously impossible tasks or improving current processes 
(Noor, 2015). 
SmartThings, a sophisticated Smart Home technology company, has developed a 
platform allowing objects commonly found in homes (such as doors or locks) 
autonomously to prioritize the usage needs of the owner (Moad, 1997).  To establish the 
SmartThings platform, the owner needs a starter kit (currently retailing at $200) and a 
Smartphone.  The aim of SmartThings is to connect all technologies that should be 
interconnected (Moad, 1997).  Modern ubiquitous device interconnectivity is vastly 
different from initial Smart Home technology attempts during the 1950s, which failed, in 
part, due to inadequate technology.  SmartThings, noted for its change in the home 
automation processes, focused on the use of cloud computing to connect to the IoT, thus 
allowing for remote monitoring and controlling of sophisticated devices using 
Smartphone applications and cloud technology (Moad, 1997). 
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It is expected that 11% of homes will have cloud-connected security systems by 
the end of 2016, increasing to 35% by 2021 (Zalud, 2014).  In addition, 13% of homes 
will have smart thermostats within 2016, increasing to 43% by 2021.  An expected 22% 
of wearable fitness devices will be adopted by the end of 2016, increasing to 43% by 
2021 (Zalud, 2014).  Despite these expected adoption rates, IoT is currently insufficiently 
advanced for the related infrastructure to support the increase in the number and type of 
gadgets available (Zalud, 2014).  At the same time, it is envisaged that IoT will extend to 
other fields, such as home security and automation of devices, including healthcare 
devices, which will affect the entire Smart Home ecosystem (Zalud, 2014).  Thus, IoE, 
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(Oriwoh & Conrad, 2015; Oriwoh & Williams, 2014).  As a result of this expansion in 
scope and functionality, IoE and IoT will present global challenges as Smart Home 
manufacturers out-produce their ability to contain security.  Additionally, it is critical to 
ensure that the devices comprising the IoT ecosystem possess and maintain 
authentication methods to protect successfully against attacks directed at legacy systems 
(Beekman & Thompson, 2014; Demblewski, 2015).  Fortunately, most authentications 
occur in proximity to the susceptible device(s).  Proximity-based authentication 
vulnerabilities are easily combated by reducing emanations or beacon power.  However, 
this aspect is most likely not within the scope of control for the homeowner; rather, it is 
inherent to the specifications set by the manufacturer.  Hence, further research is needed 
to determine if manufacturers even consider this type of threat.   
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Vulnerabilities and Solutions of IoE and IoT 
Some academics believe that IoT began with the concept of distributed 
computing, leading to enhanced communication technologies.  From this relatively 
simplistic perspective, IoT can be viewed as a means of connecting physical devices to 
one another, allowing a contextual relationship of services, and establishing a global 
network of ubiquitous devices (Popescul & Georgescu, 2013).  The basis of IoT is the 
ability to allow many different devices that have different capabilities to sense and 
communicate with each other (Albert, 2015).  Furthermore, as more corporations add IoT 
to their supply chains, the risks of cyber intrusions will exponentially increase (Krause, 
2015).  It is thus envisaged that the significance of IoT will substantially increase as more 
people and companies become technologically grounded.  Ultimately, according to some 
researchers, IoT is based on those non-electronic devices that have been embedded with 
intelligence (through sensors and other devices) and connectivity capabilities 
(Ramanathan, 2015).  At the same time, IoT is not expected to remain a small component 
of cyberspace.  Rather, it is anticipated to be a dominant factor in the future.  Yet, as IoT 
increases in importance, issues will arise due to trust management a concept that is 
presently virtually non-existent in relation to IoT (Ramanathan, 2015). 
Concerns about trust, privacy, and security began with the advent of Smartphones.  
Growing popularity of Smartphone devices prompted privacy and security concerns due 
to the volume of personal information obtained from, stored on, and shared by the 
devices and different device apps (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  Private information
 
social network information, communications, and banking information
 
was available on 
the device and was susceptible to hacking or theft.  Therefore, as Smartphones can be 
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connected to the Internet (including wearables), the general security of IoT can be 
compromised (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  According to Hodgson (2015), IoT 
advancements will have a significant effect on technology-dense industries including 
home security, smart cars, Smart Homes, industrial sensors, mobile devices, and smart 
cities
 
because of the diverse concepts defining the purposes and applications of IoT 
(Hodgson, 2015).  Although interconnected devices (such as Smart Home devices) offer 
significant benefits and are supposedly convenient for users, such devices are also 
capable of obtaining and storing highly sensitive information about the user (Waltzman & 
Shen, 2015).  Krause (2015) reported that, between 2013 and 2014, the extent of 
vulnerabilities increased by 62% (Krause, 2015).  This upward trend confirms the 
increased capacity and susceptibility of IoT to the continually emerging exploitation of its 
data (Popescul & Georgescu, 2013).  In the context of corporate IoT, vulnerability 
scanning surpassed 458% in the same period, and were typically caused by linkages 
between supply chains and internal business processes (Krause, 2015).  According to 
Hodgson (2015), by 2018, the sensor market will be worth approximately $4 billion, 
while the value of connected devices will increase to approximately $38.5 billion by 2020 
(Hodgson, 2015).  The use of sensors is important because they are the necessary 
component for establishing a relationship between virtual and physical worlds, which 
allows for reactions from the sensors to the current environment (Popescul & Georgescu, 
2013).  Therefore, there are multiple opportunities for data collection by companies.  
Analysis of this information and other collected data allows a detailed profile to be 
compiled.  As a result, those companies that obtain this information can make accurate 
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forecasts of consumer activity.  Many consumers view these analyses as privacy invasive 
(Waltzman & Shen, 2015). 
As IoT is still a relatively new market, the design of IoT devices is likely to 
present some inherent issues (Hodgson, 2015).  Furthermore, IoT offers a new threshold 
for cyber criminals to attack, which has resulted in a research gap regarding current 
security framework approaches in relation to technology advancements (Demblewski, 
2015).  Therefore, policymakers acknowledge possible IoT device implications 
(Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  Issues are also foreseen for the future, as many commercial 
IoT applications are expected to exist in many new areas (Hodgson, 2015).  Thus, 
policymakers, not only in the United States but also around the world, are developing 
ways to ensure that privacy and security standards are efficient and are upheld by the 
companies distributing and/or selling IoT devices.  At the same time, policymakers are 
cautious to ensure that these standards do not impede IoT innovation (Waltzman & Shen, 
2015).  For example, in 2013, the FTC entered the debate as actions were taken against 
Trend Net, Inc.  In this situation, it was alleged that hackers were able to access the 
FT   	
  	
 
 This cyber intrusion led the FTC to establish 
expectations of the companies offering IoT devices in 2015 (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). 
The report generated by the FTC was based on the findings of a 2013 workshop, 
during which the participants were encouraged to provide feedback with suggestions, 
along with listing the issues with IoT, and discussing necessary steps to resolve these 
problems (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  Significantly, the new FTC report considered many 
of the same privacy principles and recommendations that it had suggested in earlier 
reports concerning PCs and applied them to IoT devices.  The report recommends that 
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security and privacy be integrated and enhanced through the design of new devices 
(Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  
Thus, it is recommended that IoT device manufacturers conduct a security risk 
assessment during the design process.  Furthermore, the FTC suggested that external 
vendors that are hired must be able to maintain security, while the company should retain 
the responsibility for the oversight of the overall security (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  The 
FTC suggests that data minimization occurs through limitations put in place for obtaining 
and storing consumer data.  However, it is also known that IoT devices allow companies 
to collect data about consumers, and this practice is considered to be of significant benefit 
for future business retention (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  Despite the obvious benefits, the 
FTC cautions that the use of this data may compromise privacy through the accumulation 
of data, which may encourage hackers to steal the information.  Furthermore, the FTC 
posits that the utilization of this information may compromise privacy because consumers 
may not anticipate specific uses of their data (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  As a result, the 
FTC suggested the establishment of specific limits regarding data collection by 
companies, both sensitive and non-sensitive.  It is also important for these companies to 
destroy data when the data relevancy or need expires (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). 
The FTC also recognized the need for consumer disclosure and choice, while 
acknowledging that this can be challenging in the context of IoT.  The obstacle to 
absolute disclosure of IoT devices is partially due to many devices not containing any 
form of a user interface (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  This constraint prompted the FTC 
recommendation that no choice be offered to consumers, provided the use of the 
information remained consistent with the interaction (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  On the 
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other hand, if the use of information is inconsistent with the interaction, notification 
should be provided to consumers, allowing them to choose if and in what manner their 
data can be utilized.  This freedom of choice includes the option to decline participation 
(Waltzman & Shen, 2015). 
Also in 2015, the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation began discussing IoT issues.  In the accompanying hearing, the 
Committee heard from different experts that provided information regarding various 
topics.  Among the topics was the consideration of how to protect consumer privacy and 
provide security, while simultaneously establishing a necessary balance of innovation and 
growth (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  This balance was considered especially important to 
some experts because it is expected that IoT would benefit retail and industrial industries 
the most.  Furthermore, major concerns were raised regarding security, with one expert 
arguing that it is necessary to establish necessary security implementation during the 
design process, as well as during the manufacturing process (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  
The FTC also recommends educating consumers about data use, privacy, and security, as 
well as providing transparency in the applicable industry.  Despite these 
recommendations, the majority of the experts at the hearing did not recommend rushing 
to regulate IoT (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  In fact, the prevalent view was that 
consumers and entrepreneurs should have the choice to pursue the path towards IoT, 
rather than being impeded by regulations imposed by the government.  Thus, the hearing 
attendees acknowledged implications and promise for immense benefits relating to IoT 
use and installation (Waltzman & Shen, 2015). 
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In the European Union (EU), IoT privacy and security issues are widely 
acknowledged, and relevant bodies have worked towards resolving them since 2014.  The 
EU passed Article 29 focusing on data protection, which articulated concerns regarding 
IoT, akin to the FTC report (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  However, the EU member state 
representatives are more concerned about user awareness of data collection and 
processing, as well as the volume of data being collected by IoT devices.  Thus, this lack 
of awareness suggests that there is a significant challenge in demonstrating that there is 
valid consent by consumers according to laws and regulations in the EU (Waltzman & 
Shen, 2015).  Furthermore, the amount of data collected and its retention could already be 
leading to violations of laws and regulations within the EU.  Thus the EU mandated that 
IoT data can only be kept for a specified period, typically for as long as necessary for the 
intended purpose to be accomplished.  This restriction implied that secondary 
repurposing and profiting from data usage statistics that are not related to the original 
purpose might be in violation of EU laws and regulations due to a lack of consumer 
consent (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  Therefore, there is immense interest in IoT privacy 
and security issues, resolutions of which have been guided by FTC reports and Article 29.  
However, within the EU, Article 29 has a greater impact than the FTC report (Waltzman 
& Shen, 2015), because the latter focused on best practice recommendations and policies, 
whereas the former pertains to EU law compliance.  Significantly, the FTC did not 
require regulation of IoT issues through legislation because of the expected rate of 
technology evolution, implying that any legislation would be premature (Waltzman & 
Shen, 2015).  Ultimately, the FTC report provides a framework for future laws and 
regulations as well as their enforcement.  Thus, companies should follow the FTC report 
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recommendations, as well as Article 29, to ensure compliance with both the U.S. and EU 
regulations (Waltzman & Shen, 2015).  Because national governmental bodies are 
increasingly focusing on these issues, cyber-crime related to IoT is an issue that has 
gained prominence globally (Scott, 2015).  However, governments of some countries are 
taking no efforts to protect their systems and citizens from cyber-attacks enabled by IoT 
vulnerabilities (Scott, 2015).  On the other hand, some businesses require multilayer 
protection, especially in consideration of IoT payment devices (Scott, 2015). 
Some experts recommend prohibiting default passwords because they make it 
easier for hackers to break into the system.  Furthermore, providers and product 
incorporation must be chosen based on security levels offered (Hodgson, 2015).  
Industries must consider vulnerabilities, such as increased data collection, which may 
make them a target for theft.  As a result, it is beneficial to increase mobile security and 
understand the risks inherent in utilizing IoT devices.  This risk transference leads to 
conclusions that wireless networks are the source of the greatest risk (Hodgson, 2015).  
For example, the first worm known as the Morris Worm was created in 1988.  As of 
2014, cyber-crime has cost more than $400 billion worldwide (Scott, 2015).  At the same 
time, IoT has ethical issues attached to it, namely:   
  Ubiquity  
 
 Invisibility  
  Ambiguity  
 
 Difficult identification  
  Ultra-connectivity  
 
 Autonomous and unpredictable behavior  
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  Incorporated intelligence  
  Difficult to control   
Each of these factors has different issues attached to them.  For example, as IoT devices 
decrease in size, they will be less visible, thus masking obtrusiveness.  Reduced visibility 
will allow them to observe interactions without being detected, thus becoming more 
intrusive to privacy (Popescul & Georgescu, 2013). 
However, it is undeniable that the rapid development of IoT will cause a 
transformation in not only business but private lives as well.  Not all consequences can be 
predicted easily (O'Brien, 2015).  This difficulty stems from IoT still being largely 
undeveloped.  It can be expected, however, for IoT to impact product liability (O'Brien, 
2015).  The newly developed smart devices will have a tremendous effect on the world 
and IoT in particular.  For example, as highlighted by the 2015 FTC report, IoT and smart 
devices have increased susceptibility to unauthorized access, as well as personal 
identification/information theft and misuse (O'Brien, 2015).  This information can lead to 
attacks on other systems, such as the Anthem attack.  It is also argued that these same 
risks exist for traditional equipment, such as computers and networks (O'Brien, 2015).  
Yet, the risks inherent in IoT are much greater than those associated with traditional 
computers.  This perceived risk arises because IoT has evolved into what is currently 
termed  	 
  (O'Brien, 2015).  Through the information gathered and 
stored in data storage centers, users are vulnerable to identity theft, yet consumers argue 
that the benefits, such as increased efficiency, outweigh the risks (O'Brien, 2015). 
In 2014, Goldman Sachs issued a report suggesting that IoT is adaptable through 
wearable devices, smart cars, Smart Homes, Smart Cities, and the Industrial Internet.  
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Furthermore, IoT has been driven by different forces, such as IoT strength, due to 
decreased costs, the use of Smartphones and increased wireless coverage, revenue 
generation, and increased productivity, leading to reduced expenses (O'Brien, 2015).  The 
acceptance of IoT was illustrated at the 2015 Consumer Electronics Show, where over 
900 technologies were showcased.  The number of connectable products increases daily 
(O'Brien, 2015).  Consumers utilize IoT for energy savings and efficiency, as well as to 
be able to remotely correct problems relating to the home.  Thus, presenting an increased 
opportunity for privacy violations and external/unauthorized interference with the 
systems (O'Brien, 2015). 
The number of vulnerabilities related to IoT devices is especially concerning 
considering a 2014 Hewlett-Packard report indicating that 70% of devices are vulnerable 
to external attacks.  For instance, in 2014, there was an attack on a German steel plant 
network (O'Brien, 2015).  This cyber intrusion allowed the attackers to control the 
network externally, preventing a blast furnace from shutting down, which caused 
significant material damage (O'Brien, 2015).  This intrusion is one of only two known 
cyber-attacks that have caused physical harm   	 
		
   
 Natard 
uranium plant through malware execution (O'Brien, 2015). 
Other potential vulnerabilities can be found in smart televisions and lateral 
systems that connect to the associated network (allowing for storing/transmittal of 
personal information) including:  
 The use of IoT devices to attack personal or public networks and/or systems  

 Creating physical safety risks by, for example, affecting medical care 
appliances connected to a home network 
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Thus, according to the FTC 2015 report, the less expensive smart devices may have 
increased risks due to lower security standards (O'Brien, 2015).  In some cases, these 
cheaper devices may not offer needed security updates or incorporate other security 
protection features that may safeguard personal information.  As a result, as technology 
advances further, if corresponding security updates are not available, it is expected that 
vulnerabilities will increase in the private sector (O'Brien, 2015).  Criminal activity can 
occur through malware that would not leave any apparent traces on the device, leaving 
consumers unaware of the attack.  At the same time, there are concerns relating to issued 
patches, especially in the context of patch delivery (O'Brien, 2015).  Other predictable 
vulnerabilities from IoT devices pertain to software malfunctions causing damage to 
property or person, external attacks, and identity theft through misappropriation of 
personal data.  In the business sector, such issues result in product liabilities (O'Brien, 
2015). 
In 2015, several IoT failures occurred.  For example, in April, the wireless hub by 
Wink failed, whereby all connected devices were disabled.  Many potential breaches of 
security occurred, as a result, increasing vulnerabilities, in particular, those associated 
with home security systems (O'Brien, 2015).  Another failure occurred within 
Chamberlain and Ooma, caused by compromised IoT devices, disrupting services, 
potentially affecting  	 
   (O'Brien, 2015). 
In 2015, the first IoT class action took place due to a report by U.S. Senator 
Edward Markey.  The action involved Toyota, Ford, and GM automobile manufacturers 
(O'Brien, 2015).  The action was prompted by an investigation spearheaded by Markey in 
response to studies revealing presence of significant IoT vulnerabilities to car systems 
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that pose significant risks to the safety of drivers.  The investigation detailed the 
following vulnerabilities (O'Brien, 2015):  
  Potential privacy intrusions through wireless technologies in the car systems  
 
 Lack of awareness of intrusion possibilities  
  Inconsistent, inadequate, and/or haphazard security measures for protection 
against remote access  
 
 Lack of ability to diagnose or respond to intrusions  
  Over-reliance on technology that is not designed for security protections 
related to IoT devices   
Other privacy concerns are raised in relation to navigation systems in automobiles, which 
could be used to monitor the location of the vehicle, prompting privacy invasions.  Thus, 
owing to the failure of these companies to enhance electronic security, it was argued that 
the warranties were violated, and the vehicles were defective (O'Brien, 2015). 
In other cases, threats have been identified through commercial aircraft safety, 
considering that many IoT devices onboard an aircraft are connected to the Internet.  
Thus, the electronics system controlling the aircraft could have unauthorized access 
opportunities (O'Brien, 2015).  Therefore, it is unsurprising that IoT has been argued to 
pose the highest risks to security, along with de-globalization and supernatural category 
storms.  Part of this risk is due to the number of incidences where automated systems 
replace humans, allowing for much greater opportunities for unauthorized access to 
systems (O'Brien, 2015).  In this context, IoT device malfunctions are concerning, 
especially those related to critical infrastructures (O'Brien, 2015). 
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IoT vulnerabilities pose increased risks to vendors, due to the loss of protection 
against third-party injury claims (O'Brien, 2015).  In fact, many software vendors are 
unaware of these increased risks relating to product liability exposure due to IoT devices 
and have not stated provisions in warranty agreements (O'Brien, 2015).  Without specific 
provisions and in the absence of standards for IoT device protections, consumers are not 
afforded protection relating to IoT device failures (O'Brien, 2015). 
Short-term concerns include a lack of standards for IoT devices, which affects all 
stakeholders of the company.  Therefore, IoT companies are vulnerable when incidents 
occur (O'Brien, 2015).  One of the principal arguments generating claims and lawsuits 
will be a lack of governance by the companies to account for IoT protections, as well as 
absence or inadequacy of safety standards.  Standards are being created by the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), based on the creation of a threat model for risks.  As a part of this initiative, 
proprietary standards are also being implemented by organizations but are not yet 
completed (O'Brien, 2015).  Yet, it is argued that IoT cannot be 100% secure, despite all 
regulatory attempts (O'Brien, 2015). 
Smart Home Technology 
Akin to control systems, Smart Home technology ecosystems involves a diverse 
array of automation systems.  It is now possible to program different electronic 
equipment (such as a home stereo system) to turn on at a predetermined time.  These 
tasks, once requiring manual completion, can be controlled using a Smartphone that acts 
as a remote control for the home (Pfledderer, 2015).  In 2015, the Smart Home 
technology was valued at approximately $60 billion.  When the Smart Home technology 
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first emerged, its purpose was to automate routine household tasks.  The Smart Home 
could be programmed to alter the thermostat and thus ensure that the ambient temperature 
reaches a specific setting at a certain time, turn on electronics remotely, automatically 
turn on exterior lights (similar to motion detector lights), turn on outside irrigation (such 
as sprinklers), and other tasks.  Today, Smart Home technology has evolved to create one 
platform, such as an app, to integrate all Smart Home technologies involved.  These may 
include electronics (stereo or television), lights (outside or inside lights), and/or irrigation 
(Pfledderer, 2015).  Wink, for example, was developed by General Electric and Quirky 
and currently has the capacity to integrate approximately 25 devices with one remote 
control.  According to the company, the purpose of this technology is to solve everyday 
problems.  Most importantly, the technology is adaptable to all needs (Pfledderer, 2015). 
Despite the benefits for many users, the Smart Home market is facing some 
difficulties.  Research conducted by the Consumer Electronics Association and Parks 
Association shows that most consumers (approximately two-thirds) that have broadband 
access in their households have little or no familiarity with the Smart Home technologies 
and often do not know where Smart Home technologies can be purchased (Pfledderer, 
2015).  Therefore, the market has not yet been adapted to the new technologies.  
Moreover, as the use of this technology becomes more prevalent, new vulnerabilities and 
opportunities for cyber-crime will emerge (Pfledderer, 2015). 
Available data indicates that millions of homeowners are embracing Smart Home 
technology such as wireless X10, ZigBee, and Z-Wave devices to enhance flexibility 
and save time.  Smart technology devices include wireless doorbells, appliance controls, 
wireless smoke detectors, and wireless light switches (Srinivasan, 2012).  The acceptance 
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and use of Smart Home technology is unsurprising considering the role that technology 
plays in modern society.  For example, technology has been developed over recent 
decades to improve and/or enhance social welfare.  Social welfare has realized new ways 
for interaction to occur between humans and the environment, as well as with those 
computational things of interest (Mendes, Godina, Rodrigues, Matias, & Catalão, 2015).  
Recently, technology has been utilized to increase comfort and well-being, as evident in 
the growing use of social theories in technology design.  Energy consumption/reduction 
monitoring is one of the many ways through which well-being has been enhanced, and 
this initiative was a result of concerns considering the growing use of resources (Mendes 
et al., 2015). 
According to Mendes et al. (2015), Smart Home technology is a response to four 
different factors:  
  Significant advances in semiconductor technology, which have allowed 
computing and electronic devices to become an integral part of daily life  
  Increased processing power for microcontroller units  
  Integration of small sensor nodes that are capable of maintaining data through 
complex techniques  
  Rapid development of wireless technology (Mendes et al., 2015)  
Therefore, major market brands are intently focused on making the household products 
with a frequent turnover more intelligent (e.g., appliances, Smartphones, multimedia 
systems, lighting, heating, and home alarm systems).  One of the enabling 
communication standards that connect the aforementioned categories of devices is Z-
Wave technologies.  Z-Wave is a highly compatible wireless technology typically 
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employed in residential environments for controlling systems, monitoring devices, and 
reading device statuses (Z-Wave_Alliance, 2015).  Despite the potentially positive 
aspects of greater reliance on technology, homes are left vulnerable through different 
threats, such as Smart Home technology and mobile device design vulnerabilities 
(Wright, 2008). 
Smart Home Technology Vulnerabilities 
Tripwire, a Smart Home security company, has found vulnerabilities in three 
popular Smart Home hubs SmartThings, Vera Control, and Wink (Lemos, 2015).  Due 
to these vulnerabilities, Smart Homes are more likely to be targeted by hackers.  Web 
sites of applications designed to be malicious serve as the common vector used by 
attackers to exploit vulnerabilities and allow unauthorized users to gain control of Smart 
Home hubs.  To determine vulnerabilities, Tripwire has tested the hubs and has 
uncovered critical flaws.  These critical flaws represent vulnerabilities that could provide 
opportunities for attackers to eavesdrop on communications or even take control of the 
hub (Lemos, 2015).  In November 2014, several common issues were found, such as 
command injection that would provide root access to the Wink hub.  According to Craig 
  		
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	 		 discovered with little difficulty (Lemos, 
2015).  The main vulnerabilities in the Wink hub pertained to SQL-injections, which 
could allow an attacker to issue commands to other smart devices, access unauthorized 
functions to the hub and wireless network, or even establish and load a backdoor (Lemos, 
2015; Microsoft_Security_Bulletin_MS10-089, 2010).  Immediately upon discovering 
the vulnerabilities, Wink repaired the flaws.  Vera Control vulnerabilities stem from 
cross-site request forgery (CSRF) issues.  CSRF issues have the potential to allow 
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nefarious computational instructions to be processed by the hub by permitting an 
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controlled Web content, thus providing the attacker with unauthorized access to personal 
information (Lemos, 2015).  As of February 2015, Vera Control had not repaired the 
issues.  However, a minor security issue was found in the SmartThings hub, as it was 
limited to the potential for eavesdropping in limited situations (Lemos, 2015).  
SmartThings issued mitigations as a part of a mandatory automatic update for all active 
hubs, while also allowing inactive hubs to connect to the SmartThings service and receive 
the update.  These types of hubs used in Smart Homes utilize embedded hardware, due to 
which the built-in security is in most cases inferior to that found in traditional security 
systems (Lemos, 2015).  As a result, there are industry-wide problems caused by low-cost 
embedded devices.  Flaws inherent in these devices demonstrate that any error can cause 
a significant vulnerability, causing immense damage and/or harm to the system.  These 
hubs lack basic protections provided by most modern operating systems for PCs (Lemos, 
2015). 
The issues uncovered by Tripwire confirmed the presence of concerns regarding 
the ability of attackers to control Smart Home functionalities.  For example, Smart Home 
hubs are specifically designed to control different aspects of the home, such as lighting, 
heating, irrigation, and even locks and cameras (Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b).  The issues 
uncovered by Tripwire were especially concerning because they provided means for 
successful exploitation, such as allowing hackers to determine when the house is empty 
(Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b).  Consequently, it would be possible to utilize the network 
to change settings within the Smart Home. 
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While the use of Smart Home hubs has increased, functionality is still more 
important than security, which is a common drawback of newer technologies.  Young, 
however, cautioned that, although the current threat is low, it would inevitably increase 
(Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b).  This potential threat will occur because attackers will 
eventually realize that a significant amount of information can be gained from attacking 
these hubs (Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b).  Therefore, Smart Home hubs can be exploited 
to decrease security in homes and/or cause physical damage to the home being attacked, 
or even its occupants.  Some Smart Home hubs are particularly vulnerable to executions 
occurring through exoteric controls, which can allow hackers to hide on the network 
(Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b).  
Risks users are exposed to are also becoming greater, given the increases in IoT 
and communication abilities related to devices connected to IoT (ConsumerReports, 
2015).  Yet, these communication abilities offer convenience to consumers.  Thus, there 
must be a balance between practicality and protection, as Smart Home devices have 
capabilities to send personal data to corporate servers, commonly used in ways that 
consumers cannot control (ConsumerReports, 2015).  Therefore, private information can 
be collected, combined, and exploited.  This aggregation commonly occurs by marketers, 
but such data can also be stolen (ConsumerReports, 2015).  The concerns regarding 
stolen aggregated private information have led to politicians, such as U.S. Senator Ed 
Markey, to call for more scrutiny regarding IoT.  Markey argued that rules that are strong 
and can be legally enforced to protect personal information are urgently needed 
(ConsumerReports, 2015).  There were approximately 109 million wearable devices in 
use globally at the end of 2014.  As a result, millions of data items was generated, 
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confirming that technology is more advanced than current privacy laws 
(ConsumerReports, 2015). 
Smart Home vulnerabilities are a common fear of consumers.  According to one 
study by Veracode, reliance on smart devices increases vulnerabilities.  As a part of this 
investigation, R. Brown (2015) reviewed four manufacturers Chamberlain, 
SmartThings, Ubi, and Wink.  The devices reviewed were MyQ Garage, MyQ Gateway, 
home automation hub, voice recognition box, and hub and relay control panel (R. Brown, 
2015).  The following four categories were employed in the evaluation:  
 Potential vulnerabilities implicit in communication between devices and the 
cloud  
 Potential vulnerabilities implicit in communication between the device and the 
remote control  
 Potential vulnerabilities related to the device interfaces 
 Potential vulnerabilities pertaining to debugging interfaces, which might allow 
unauthorized access to commands at the engineering level   
The findings revealed that Ubi was the least protected (R. Brown, 2015).  Many issues 
affecting Ubi were identified, such as limited encryption during communications between 
devices and the cloud, password requirement weaknesses, and few access restrictions to 
its debugging interface (R. Brown, 2015). 
These vulnerabilities through home automation technologies can allow anyone, 
including those with limited technical abilities, to access properties all over the world.  
Honeywell, known as one of the biggest U.S. technology manufacturers, has two such 
flaws.  Additionally, it is relatively 	
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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Tuxedo Touch web interfaces through unauthorized access.  As a result, those controlling 
these interfaces have capabilities to manage the home components that are connected to 
 	 
 
  (Fox-Brewster, 2015).  These flaws could provide an 
attacker opportunity to control devices or processes, such as security cameras.  Other 
vulnerabilities found in the authentication procedure were significant because there was 
no requirement for interactions between the attacker and the one being attacked (Fox-
Brewster, 2015).  The flaws can also be utilized to provide information regarding when 
homes are unoccupied.  Furthermore, attackers can open the locks to the home without 
authorization and/or change alarm settings.  These activities also allow unauthorized 
users to turn smart hubs into zombies through accessing local area networks (Fox-
Brewster, 2015).  In other cases, a malicious web page can be used to provide the attacker 
with complete and total access and control of the system through the exploitation of input 
validation failures on the web interfaces.  Through the exploitation possibilities found, 
hackers would be able to utilize Smart Home technology vulnerabilities to use the hub for 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) purposes (Tripwire Inc., 2015a, 2015b).  Therefore, 
as Tripwire shows, due to the serious flaws found in popular systems purchased, homes 
may be at risk (Moore, 2015).  Furthermore, although the threat is low, it is expected to 
increase as technology becomes more prevalent and more homes become equipped with 
Smart Home technologies (Moore, 2015).  Thus, there are very real risks with numerous 
points of entry.  It is important for vendors to acknowledge these vulnerabilities as well 
as provide regular updates aimed at mitigating them.  Furthermore, consumers need to 
recognize and understand the risks of Smart Home technology and apply the updates 
(Moore, 2015). 
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Extant studies suggest that over 1 billion connected devices used in millions of 
Smart Homes will have emerged by 2017 (eRadar, 2015); Gartner & Gartner, 2015).  
However, numerous vulnerabilities exist even in conjunction with single-function devices 
(such as lights), as well as in fully automated homes (eRadar, 2015; Gartner & Gartner, 
2015; Weinberg, Milne, Andonova, & Hajjat, 2015).  Therefore, growing evidence of 
access violations through smart devices to Smart Homes exists. 
Currently, no major breach has been attributed to home security or a related 
automation system; yet, due to the vulnerabilities, the potential exists (Griffin, 2014a).  
Popular security expos routinely reveal practical research that validates the simplicity 
involved in comprising basic security measures.  For example, researchers have 
demonstrated the ability to exploit a Samsung smart fridge through an invalid SSL 
implementation (Venda, 2015).  In fact, according to a Hewlett-Packard study, 70% of 
common IoT devices have different vulnerabilities, such as password weaknesses, lack of 
communications encryption, and lack of user access permissions (Griffin, 2014a).  Other 
vulnerabilities include potential for cyber intrusions and vulnerable systems, which may 
allow hackers access because systems are commonly controlled through remote controls 
(such as a Smartphone app or web portal), enabling criminals to break into Smartphones, 
and/or tablets in order to steal private and/or corporate data (Griffin, 2014a).  These 
issues increase in scope and prevalence because the devices used in Smart Home 
technology are non-intelligent and operate individually.  As a result, they can be 
controlled through remote functions.  At the same time, since this technology is non-
intelligent, they are afforded few authentication mechanisms, if any (Griffin, 2014a). 
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Moreover, some devices are susceptible to user account resets due to insufficient 
password and credential complexity in an attempt to retain simplicity for the typical daily 
user (Neagle, 2015).  As technicalities increase, vulnerabilities increase because 
manufacturers failed to design these devices securely, depending instead on the end user 
to secure the devices (Neagle, 2015).  Thus, in some cases, Smart Home technology can 
be disabled, allowing criminals time to enter the home, and then re-activate the system.  
Some higher-end Smart Home products are appropriately focused on security in their 
designs.  This trend is expected to increase as the market and technology mature.  
However, current IoT security standards continue to be developed and established 
(Neagle, 2015). 
Exploratory Research 
The expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) in distributed computing platforms, 
cloud technologies, ubiquitous devices, and Smart Home ecosystems has evolved the 
notions of research in the field of computer science to include extended interpretations 
(Sharoff, 1995).  Sharoff's (1995) study is based on the assertion that a paradigm of 
human-independent intelligent devices fits into philosophical investigations.  According 
to the author, in computer science, philosophical investigations can follow constructs 
similar to those employed in the cognitive sciences.  Marshall and Rossman (1999) 
concurred with this view, further noting that exploratory research in the fields of 
cognitive science and computer science helps determine how patterns are interrelated.  
Ubiquitous devices and distributed computing systems involve many aspects that adapt 
and learn as they interact and integrate information (Holland, 2006).  The concept of 
information integration of autonomous device interaction beyond human actions is used 
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in the present study to discover naturalizations that occur and affect vulnerability 
exposure and cyber security (Schroeder, 2015).  
Other theoretical approaches to computer science research relevant to exploratory 
   	
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  ontological worldview (A. Brown, 2015).  Brown suggested 
that the widespread acceptance of information technology artifacts used in everyday life 
stems from the seminal concept of existential ontology.  In existential Heidegger 
ontology, phenomenological research is conducted when the aim is to qualify variances 
in organizational usage.  The theoretical basis of Heidegger ontology, as applied to 
phenomenological research in computer science, is limited to interpretivist and empirical 
constructivist methods and implicitly demands that data collection involves some human 
element (A. Brown, 2015) 
    
     ontological 
research design, in the present study, it was not possible to provide a formulative 
assessment of interactions between devices and the intuitive operation of the Smart Home 
ecosystem. 
Qualitative exploratory research is particularly useful for the scientific 
community, as it facilitates conducting formulative research on integral parts of a 
developing system (Silhavy, Senkerik, Oplatkova, Silhavy, & Prokopova, 2014).  In such 
an approach, data collection occurs through a wide array of systemic methods, including 
interviews, participant reports, and detailed observations.  While human involvement is, 
as noted above, valuable, the researcher must remain minimally intrusive, to avoid 
introducing bias in any observable results.  Data analysis is equally comprehensive and 
systemic, whereby the method of analysis follows the nature of the data itself (Waters, 
n.d.).  In addition, by identifying commonalities and correlations in data, common themes 
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are allowed to emerge.  This approach allows the researcher to assign meaning to abstract 
variables which may or may not qualify as influential factors or essential aspects (Waters, 
n.d.).  The results yielded by qualitative exploratory research can unveil findings and 
themes that relate to theories presented in empirical studies (Waters, n.d.).  The 
discussion of the findings and emergent themes not only helps elucidate the lived 
experience but also expands on the themes pertinent to similar contexts described in other 
sources.   
Case Study 
Case study approach is adopted when the goal is to conduct an empirical 
evaluative inquiry into a phenomenon within its real-life context (Creswell, 2013; 
Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009; Yin, 2014).  Case studies assist in evaluating emergent 
technologies, due to the implicit assumption of contextual transference and 
generalization.  It is imperative to note that, in the context of the present study, these 
assumptions were made solely in order to facilitate a high-level functional overview of 
the particular capabilities of technology, aligned with the described CA theory.  The case 
study construct is significant to emergent technology capabilities as it draws an in-depth 
singularity of a phenomenon being studied (Simons, 2009).  The case study approach, 
within the scope of emergent technology, helps explore the problems at the juncture of 
Smart Home security and cyber intrusions, thus illuminating shared characteristics.  More 
specifically, in the present investigation, the case study is designed to provide insight into 
inherent or overlooked Smart Home security issues, as a means of redrawing 
generalizations pertinent to personal cyber security.  This design framework enhances 
collective understanding of relative tertiary effects (Merriam, 2009).  Yin (2014) 
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proposed a multiple case sampling procedure that aggressively evaluates cross-case 
implications by refining initial theories and data collection methods, and subsequently 
correlating findings with a series of cases (see Figure 2).  Figure 2 depicts theory 
development as the initial step in designing a case study.  Once a theory is developed, the 
researcher proceeds with case selection and defining specific measures in the data 
collection process.  Yin (2014) further explored how the conduct of each case study 
report should evolve to refine and indicate the extent to which logic is replicated across 
each case study.  If required, the researcher then contrasts the results (represented by the 
dash red line feedback loop).  The steps associated with the depicted feedback process 
represent a situation where important discovery occurs during the conduct of one of the 
individual case studies, warranting reconsideration of one or more original theoretical 
propositions (Yin, 2014).  At the end of each case study, individual case reports are 
written, as this assists in the development of cross-case conclusions and contributes to the 
quality and comprehensiveness of the final case report. 
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many countries to invest extensive funds into the prevention and the mitigation of 
damage caused by cyber-attacks.  The threat of cyber-attacks has increased and has 
expanded into many different areas.  In particular, organizations that handle sensitive data 
(such as healthcare/insurance agencies and retailers) have become vulnerable, along with 
users of smart equipment (such as appliances at home that are controlled remotely).  
Evidence shows that the entire globe has become vulnerable to this threat, and the Smart 
Home is no exception (Dunn Cavelty, 2014).   
The exact cost of cyber-crime is difficult to estimate, not only because some 
damage cannot be easily quantified, but also because such breaches are insufficiently 
reported.  Problems related to cyber-crime also involve investigation barriers, which 
commonly enable perpetrators to continue to attack other victims.  Due to the immense 
media attention, fear of negative publicity or consumer backlash remains one of the major 
investigation barriers (J. Smith, 2003).  Inadequate security measures and numerous 
vulnerabilities are partially the reason that cyber-crime threats exist.  Therefore, as 
technology usage increases, unless the security measures keep the pace, they will become 
increasingly inadequate.  Thus, more attacks will be attempted, many of which will be 
successful.  Common attack attempts using malware are becoming more advanced, more 
common, and more dangerous. 
The focus of the CIA Triad was to provide a framework to balance security and 
technology advancement.  The Triad focuses on benchmarking the effective security 
measures and eliminating or decreasing risks.  Although the Triad has been proven 
effective, it cannot prevent all attacks, especially as they continue to advance is scope and 
severity.  The Triad, however, remains significant because it focuses on balancing 
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acceptable levels of data security, accommodations for privacy, obtainable non-
repudiation levels, and consistent access (Fenrich, 2007, 2008).  The most frequent 
attacks occur against organizations that store and maintain substantial amounts of 
sensitive data, including governmental agencies.  The Smart Home ecosystem has yet to 
suffer the same distributed onslaught of cyber intrusions.  However, the dynamics and 
diversity of the technologies introduced to the Smart Home broaden the attack surface 
and invite the possibilities of complex cyber intrusions.  As a result, cyber-attacks 
threaten the validity and usefulness of the Triad.  This threat is especially significant as it 
is envisaged that Smart Home technology will become widespread. 
Smart Home technology is part of IoE and IoT and can be used professionally and 
personally.  The goal of this type of technology is to enhance convenience while reaping 
positive economic benefits.  However, in order for these benefits to be fully realized, 
cyber security that encapsulates the full extent of IoE and IoT is necessary, because only 
such a comprehensive approach can assist in protecting all types of smart technology, 
rather than relying on individualized security for specific products or brands.  IoE and 
IoT represent significant security challenges due to the complexity and diversity of the 
devices utilized.  Therefore, it is evident that some of the seemingly most convenient 
devices and functionalities (such as the ability to turn the radio/stereo on) may become 
the prominent focus of targeted cyber intrusions.  Victims of such attacks are less likely 
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  perpetuate 
financial crimes, as they are rarely identified, yet, when compiled, manifest in significant 
invasions.  The Smart Home inherits the technology concepts introduced in IoT and IoE.  
Thus, it is important to be aware of these vulnerabilities, failures in security, and potential 
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vectors through which cyber-attacks can occur.  In this way, security within the larger 
architecture of the IoT, the IoE, and the Smart Home ecosystem can be increased or 
improved to protect all users and all data. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
Overview of the Research 
Yin (2014) employed the multiple case study inquiry as a method to evaluate 
emergent technologies, as described in Chapter 2.  This strategy was adopted in the 
present study.  The aim of the qualitative exploratory multiple case study inquiry 
described in this work was to explore using open source tools and investigate the 
behavioral heuristics of the Smart Home ecosystem at the data link level, observing frame 
PDU data for TCP/UDP conversations.  This necessitated constructing an IoT ecosystem, 
comprising of a controlled Smart Home environment, which was observed during a 
typical life cycle of initial configuration and routine usage tasks, whereby the data 
collected was subsequently analyzed.   
The chosen research approach embodies emergent object behavior present in the 
Smart Home ecosystem.  Case study research brings clarity to complex issues in the field 
of IoT by extending the real-life experience and situational context, allowing the Smart 
Home ecosystem to be examined.  The case studies discussed here are only limited by 
lack of understanding; hence, research in the field of Smart Home ecosystems can be 
expanded to explore applications prominent in the cyber security field.  When meeting 
the aims of the present investigation, the case study approach was preferred to other 
qualitative research strategies (e.g., experimentation, archival, and historical analysis) 
because emergent object behavior and vulnerabilities in the Smart Home ecosystem can 
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be observed in a real life application (Yin, 2014).  It is assumed that cyber-attack 
prevention in the resource-limited home environment is insufficiently combated using 
conventional tools and applications, such as antivirus software, firewalls, and other 
security measures (Agapov & Rahman, 2008).  Additionally, practitioners in the field of 
the Smart Home ecosystem development have identified areas of concern regarding 
privacy and security in IoT (Albert, 2015; Babar, Stango, Prasad, Sen, & Prasad, 2011; R. 
Brown, 2015; ConsumerReports, 2015; Demblewski, 2015; Neagle, 2015).  Privacy and 
security requirements in Smart Home ecosystem differ tremendously from those pertinent 
to personal and mobile computing platforms (Albert, 2015; Babar et al., 2011; R. Brown, 
2015; ConsumerReports, 2015; Demblewski, 2015; Neagle, 2015).  As a part of the 
present study, a vulnerability test was conducted, involving various wireless sensor 
network (WSN) products, ubiquitous networks, and pervasive computing in the 
categories of appliances, Smartphones, multimedia systems, lighting, heating, and home 
alarm systems, all of which operate within the Smart Home domain.  Moreover, devices 
in the Smart Home domain either consume user data or traverse availability prioritized 
architecture.  The case studies described here were thus conducted in an attempt to 
demonstrate that the LM-CIRT model can be successfully adopted to mitigate threats in 
the Smart Home ecosystem.  In the present study, it was also employed as a means of 
performing an effective security assessment, as well as to implement an appropriate 
threat mitigation in the Smart Home ecosystem (see Figure 5).  The case study was 
conducted in a controlled environment, which contained all of the products in the 
aforementioned categories, described in more detail later in this chapter.  
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Research Traditions 
The research traditions discussed in Chapter 2 expound upon the nature of 
exploratory research using a qualitative methodology as applied to Smart Home 
ecosystems.  In this study, exploratory research was based on the premise that a paradigm 
of human-independent intelligent devices in a Smart Home ecosystem can represent the 
independent interactions that can be observed from a cognitive notion of object behavior, 
be it intentional or unintentional.  The exploratory research framework meets the 
objectives of discovering vulnerability exposure and cyber security implications by 
defining the concepts by which information integration and autonomous device 
interaction is recorded.  In conjunction with the case study, exploratory research declares 
the autonomy of emergent object behavior present in the Smart Home ecosystem.  
Figure 3 depicts a recursive evaluation of the Smart Home ecosystem datalink 
layer protocol data units from the existing Intrusion Kill Chain design model.  The 
proposed case study framework allows building the appropriate case while concurrently 
developing the data collection methodology to obtain the anticipated results.  Following 
the logical diagram is shown in Figure 3, the researcher sequentially conducted each case 
study and compiled individual case study reports.  In the next phase, the findings yielded 
by the case studies were utilized in answering the research questions, as well as to 
determine appropriateness to the case study framework.  The relevance of the findings 
were used to examine whether the research approach required additional propositions, 
before reporting the overall results.  In the event, the proposition inferred from data 
collection is inadequate (represented by the red dotted line in the diagram), the researcher 
must re-evaluate the case study framework and the data collection procedures to identify 
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potential shortcomings.  Once this process is completed, the researcher can resume the 
case study, employing the modified framework and data collection procedures, 
summarizing findings pertinent to each case.  The researcher then continues to record 
preliminary cross-case conclusions and proceeds through the case study sequence using 
the original propositions, the original or modified case study framework, and the original 
or modified data collection procedures as a guide (represented by the black dotted line).  
The data obtained through the case studies allow the researcher to validate the data's 
alignment with the existing theories.  In the present study, the case study data was 
examined in relation to Intrusion Kill Chain Theory (see Table 1), whereby all applicable 
implications inferred from the data analysis were carefully recorded.  Finally, the 
researcher concluded the reports, detailing all study findings, and summarizing the key 
findings as relevant to inter-case relationships.  
Figure 3. Multiple Case Study Design. 
 
Figure 3. Multiple Case Study Design. From Case study research: Design and 
methods (B. Bauhaus Ed., 5th ed.), by R. K. Yin, 2014. 
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of this study.  This study presents an array of tools available on the Debian 7 platform, 
which is designed to highlight packet content in transit from a node to an endpoint.  The 
tools available include network vulnerability scans and network forensics tools.  This 
study was conducted using a desktop computer with a Debian 7 based operating system 
to act as a software-based sensor at the pivotal borders of the Smart Home ecosystem 
network environment.  The first case study was designed to counter attacker-driven 
reconnaissance efforts.  In addition, its aim was to enhance discovery of any existing 
implants on the Smart Home ecosystem network and/or determine the visibility of 
common vulnerabilities from internal and external network vantages.  The 
reconnaissance/discovery phase of the Intrusion Kill Chain illuminates a victim's typical 
device-specific vulnerabilities.  Because most Smart Home devices are not purposed to 
process a broad array of file formats (Abu-Elkheir, Hayajneh, & Ali, 2013; 
Working_Party, 2010), the weaponization of any payload is limited to execution of 
system-specific tasks, e.g., firmware upgrades or device health status (Babar et al., 2011).  
Both reconnaissance/discovery and weaponization evaluation efforts performed as a part 
of the first case study helped determine how secure Smart Home systems function 
independently from other devices (aligned with RQ1).  The specific goal was to 
determine confidentiality and authentication susceptibility to cyber intrusions, whereby it 
was expected that possible vulnerabilities (or threats) would manifest based on each 
device's response.  As previously noted, it was also envisaged that, if the devices outlined 
in the case study do respond with a positive identification of an exploited vulnerability, 
the case study data collection process would be revised to allow for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the suspected node and the endpoint communication 
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behaviors.  The recorded packet capture and sensory data of the first case study were used 
during the second case study to help filter benign endpoint TCP/UDP conversations that 
have occurred because of automated node communications.  The aim of case study two 
was to examine the types of behavioral data exchange or aggregate device 
communication that occur between Smart Home objects and effect fundamental security 
levels (aligned with RQ2).  The objective was to determine node-to-node confidentiality, 
authentication, and integrity susceptibility to cyber intrusions.  During the delivery, 
exploitation and installation phases of a cyber intrusion, an attacker must be able to 
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instructions in the remote device's instruction pointer, have the device execute malicious 
instructions, and adequately redirect the instruction pointer's anticipated state to an 
appropriate registry location (Englander, 2009; Raucher, 2015).  Tools that are described 
in detail later in this chapter were employed to illuminate the cyber intrusion process.  
The procedures required to analyze these processes may expose the possibility of this 
vulnerability (or threat), provided that actual device complexity exists to respond to RPC 
instructions, per device or collectively.  In an event that the devices outlined in the case 
study did respond with a positive identification of an exploited vulnerability, the case 
study design theory was revised to analyze in greater detail the suspected node(s)' 
endpoint communication behaviors.  Moreover, an advanced IDS rule was developed to 
alert on the observed action.  The recorded signature rules, packet capture, or sensory 
data from the first and second case studies were used to provide a more advanced 
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signature rule set.  The final rule set was evaluated to mitigate the occurrence of false 
positive or false negative IDS alerts.  The effective IDS control state was recorded and 
used in the third case study to alert and notify of the existence of applicable payloads.  
Case study three was the culmination of the aforementioned efforts, whereby it 
incorporated all observations and controls employed in the first and second case study.  
Its aim was to identify the emergent security issues related to Smart Home object 
behavior (aligned with RQ3).  The case study sought to determine how personal safety 
relating to cyber security, personal cyber security resilience to cyber-threats, and 
personally identifiable information relating to undisclosed information collection is 
impacted in a real life context.  The command and control and actions on objective 
phases of the Intrusion Kill Chain model would typically require the cyber intrusion actor 
(or function) to create a reliable path to the node it controls.  Subsequently, the cyber 
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controlled nodes to execute instructions at will (with or without sending an 
acknowledgment of successful code execution) (Hutchins et al., 2011).  The reports 
generated upon completion of the prior case studies were evaluated in the third case study 
to determine if the observed conditions aided in the discovery of malicious traffic.  This 
compilation of data included private usage information (or any other privacy 
information), detailed information about configurations of devices if such data was 
communicated, their firmware versions, or any other information that would give the 
attacker useful reconnaissance information.  
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Sample 
The sample, in the context of the present study, pertains to the devices involved in 
the controlled environment.  In other words, it pertains to all devices that can be 
categorized as Smart Home devices that have the capacity to exhibit behavior beyond the 
intended design.  As devices in a controlled environment, rather than humans, were the 
object of investigation, this definition of sample is not conventional.  In addition, in the 
controlled environment, controlled refers to the fact that the researcher owns and operates 
the itemized equipment as an average consumer.  Figure  depicts the high-level overview 
of the constructed controlled Smart Home ecosystem.  In the controlled environment, the 
nodes listed in Table 2 were configured as per manufacturer recommendations and were 
connected accordingly to the Smart Home ecosystem as depicted.  Each node can 
communicate with external addresses either through the Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
or through the cellular provider's data service.  A switch was used to connect additional 
nodes that span beyond the connections available on the border router.  The network 
traffic sensor (represented by the yellow triangle on the right) for the wired connection 
uses a hub to expand possible connections between the router and the modem.  This hub 
connection connects to the computer and the network interface card (NIC) was set to 
passive promiscuous mode in order to minimize interference with routed traffic between 
the router and the modem.  Both the modem and the router were configured as per 
manufacturer-recommended settings for both wired (represented by the solid green lines) 
and wireless (represented by the solid red line) connections, as applicable.  The network 
traffic sensor (represented by the yellow triangle on the left) for the wireless connection 
uses a USB dongle to create a direct link between the PC and sub-1 GHz frequencies, 
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number, and how each appropriate device communicates according to the manufacturer 
configuration, along with the category (in terms of the typical arrangement in a Smart 
Home ecosystem).  
Table 2   
IoT Ecosystem Components 
 
Node Manufacturer Model  Communications  Category 
Home Router NETGEAR R6300v2 Wireless & Wired Home Infrastructure 
Switch Cisco Catalyst Express 500 Wired Home Infrastructure 
Modem NETGEAR CM400 Wired Home Infrastructure 
Z-Wave Range 
Extender/Repeater 
Aeon Labs Aeotec DSD37-ZWUS Z-Wave Home Infrastructure 
Power Line Adapter NETGEAR XAV5201 Wireless & Wired Home Infrastructure 
Electronic Deadbolt Kwikset 910 Z-Wave Home Security 
Wireless Keypad 2GIG Technologies 2GIG PAD1 345 Z-Wave Home Security 
Door/Window Contact 
Sensor 
2GIG Technologies 2GIG-DW10-345 Z-Wave Home Security 
Wireless Control Panel 2GIG Technologies 2GIG-CNTRL1-345 Z-Wave Home Security 
Takeover Module 2GIG Technologies 2GIG-TAKE-345 Z-Wave Home Security 
Passive infrared motion 
detector 
2GIG Technologies 2GIG-PIR1-345 Z-Wave Home Security 
Smoke/Heat Detector 2GIG Technologies 2GIG-SMKT2-345 Z-Wave Home Security 
Internal GSM Antenna 2GIG Technologies 2GIG-ANT1 Cellular Home Security 
External In-Wall GSM 
Antenna 
2GIG Technologies 2GIG-ANT1X Cellular Home Security 
AT&T Go-Control 
Vivint 
2GIG Technologies 2GIG-GC3GA-V Cellular Home Security 
Radio Thermostat 2GIG Technologies 2GIG-Z-CT100 Z-Wave HVAC 
Z-Wave In-Wall 
On/Off Switch 
LEVITON DZS15-1LW DZC Z-Wave lighting 
Z-Wave Wireless 
Lighting Control 
Dimmer Switch 
General Electric 12724 Z-Wave lighting 
Multimedia system ROKU  Wireless Multimedia Systems 
TV Sharp LC-60LE640U Wireless & Wired Multimedia Systems 
Satellite Receiver Direct TV HR44-700 Wireless Multimedia Systems 
Gaming System PlayStation3 CECH-2501A Wireless Multimedia Systems 
Computer Alienware  Wireless & Wired Multimedia Systems 
Network Attached 
Storage 
Seagate NAS440 Wired Multimedia Systems 
Smart Phone Samsung SM-N920V Wireless & Cellular Multimedia Systems 
Tablet Samsung SM-P905V  Multimedia Systems 
Multimedia system ROKU 2710X Wireless Multimedia Systems 
Computer Hewlett Packard ZUA5070D57 USB,  Z-Wave, 
Wireless, & Wired 
Multimedia Systems 
Sensor Module  Texas Instruments CC1111EMK USB & Z-Wave Test & Evaluation 
Sensor Module 
Programmer  
Travis Goodspeed GoodFET v42 1279 USB & Z-Wave Test & Evaluation 
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Instrumentation, Data Collection, and Analysis 
The case study instrumentation and data collection plan were designed to 
facilitate recording as much detail as possible.  This not only assisted with the individual 
and cross-case study analysis but also allowed compiling the final results and reaching 
study conclusions.  The effectiveness of each case study was assessed based on the 
recommendations made by the authorities in the field of IoT security, specifically the 
NIST SP 800-53 technical safeguards or countermeasures that, if implemented, could 
prevent or ameliorate cyber intrusion events (Abrams & Weiss, 2007).  Individual case 
studies are described in detail in the subsequent sections. 
Case Study 1 
Case study1 data was collected via Wireshark (an open-source packet capture 
software), which allows for the full packet capture of all TCP/UDP connection sessions 
through the wired gateway in and out of the Smart Home ecosystem.  TCP/UDP traffic 
was passively observed through the wired gateway using a throwing Star LAN TAP as a 
passive Ethernet tap.  Additionally, Z-Wave traffic was captured with the Texas 
Instruments CC1111EMK, which allowed the capture of traffic using Z-Force (open 
source Z-Wave specific traffic capture software, (Fouladi & Ghanoun, 2013)) in the sub-
1 GHz frequency range in which Z-Wave traffic operates.   
Raw data was analyzed to determine endpoint origins and terminations (see Table 
6).  The collection of externally viewed conversations assists in the analysis of TCP/UDP 
traffic viewable from endpoint to endpoint.  In this case study, traffic was analyzed to 
determine the location of the associated node communications.  Extensive analysis was 
also conducted on externally viewed conversations to determine if the traffic can be 
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monitored from an external source beyond the router.  The collection of internally viewed 
conversations assisted in the evaluation of TCP/UDP traffic communicating laterally with 
other devices.  Analysis of internally viewed conversations allowed identifying nodes or 
devices that communicate with other internal devices, as well as elucidating the purpose 
of this exchange.  Subsequently, conversations that contain any payload, without regard 
to purpose or function, were recorded to identify if the observed traffic should be 
occurring with any external or internal entities.  Table 3 displays a coding matrix that 
helps to summarize sample data that emerged from traffic analysis of external 
conversations from outside the network, internal to the network, and any associated 
conversation payloads from outside or within the network.  A coding matrix is significant 
to data collection, as it assists with identifying areas where further research of the 
observed activity is required. 
Table 3 
Case Study 1 Data Collection Template 
 
Node External Conversations Internal Conversations Payload 
Sample 1 Activity Activity Contents 
Summary 
Case Study 2 
The data collected through the first case study was analyzed in the second case 
study in order to develop a custom IoT-focused rule set for the open source Debian 7 
based operating system network intrusion detection system (NIDS) solution (SNORT) 
configured in line with the community rules profile.  This analysis helped establish the 
extent to which behavioral data exchange or aggregate device communication occurs 
between IoT objects that effect fundamental security levels.  Table 4 displays a coding 
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matrix that summarizes the sample data that emerged from the IDS alerts that were 
triggered by external conversations from outside the network directed internally, as well 
as internal conversations from inside the network directed externally.  The relevant 
internal and external conversations were summarized based on general activity, and the 
activity was matched to the associated IDS configurations.  Similar to case study one, the 
payloads of the internal and external conversations were recorded and further researched.  
The configuration that triggered the IDS alerts against the associated conversation traffic 
was also recorded.  Table 4 also helps illuminate node activity associations between the 
scope of visibility of all Smart Home traffic and IDS alert configurations in identifying 
Smart Home traffic.  It is also important to note that traffic observed outbound or inbound 
to the controlled environment needs to contain acceptable levels of encryption, as traffic 
that meets this criterion is publicly visible. 
Table 4   
 
Case Study 2 Data Collection Template 
 
Node Conversation Payload Signature 
Sample 1 Internal or external activity Contents Summary SNORT configuration 
Case Study 3 
The aim of case study three was to identify the emergent security issues related to 
Smart Home object behavior that affects personal safety relating to cyber security, 
resilience to cyber-threats, and personally identifiable information (PII) when 
confidential information is resident in the Smart Home ecosystem.  Ultimately, data 
gathered through case study three facilitated analysis of the IDS configuration to identify 
internal or external Smart Home conversations.  IDS configuration analysis was 
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conducted to identify internal or external Smart Home encrypted traffic.  The IDS 
configuration analysis also allowed establishing whether the IDS can identify 
conversations that contain PII in its PDU payload, as well as nodes responding to 
vulnerability scans.  Finally, it enabled the researcher to ascertain if the IDS can control 
whether Smart Home devices establish point-to-point conversations with internal or 
external nodes that are transmitting PII or vulnerability data as a payload (see Table 5).  
Table 5   
 
Case Study 3 Data Collection Template 
 
Node  Signature Payload PII Vulnerabilities Controls 
Sample 1 SNORT 
configuration 
Encrypted or 
Unencrypted Yes or No Yes or No 
SNORT 
configuration 
Validity and Reliability 
The controlled environment is not influenced by researcher's prior knowledge of 
any vulnerabilities or threats.  Moreover, it can be replicated completely, given that the 
replicated environment acquires the nodes and tools discussed in the earlier parts of this 
chapter.  All sources of data were reported within the constraints of the ethical 
considerations outlined in the next section.  Unaltered and transparent data collection and 
reporting procedures were pivotal to developing accurate cross-case analysis during the 
conduct of all three case studies.  
Ethical Considerations 
Human participation in this research was limited to possible disclosure of 
information about the researcher's Smart Home ecosystem that could be repurposed 
nefariously.  The potential for exposure also existed as vulnerabilities unique to Smart 
Home nodes owned by the researcher are discovered.  The possible disclosure of other 
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personally owned wireless networks that are in proximity to the controlled environment 
presented an additional concern that had to be considered.  In order to mitigate the risks 
of personal information disclosure, appropriate efforts were made to sanitize data 
collected containing specific individually identifiable information.  Vulnerabilities that 
were discovered, identifying specific nodes, were generalized to the function of the node, 
as the individual node relates to the overall Smart Home ecosystem.  Collateral networks 
that are in proximity to the controlled environment were identified as a part of the data 
collection process and were not reported in the final analysis.  
Summary of Chapter 3 
The methodology chosen for the present study was a deliberate attempt to 
reconcile an exploratory approach to an emerging technology using case studies.  
Multiple methods were explored, which could potentially illuminate privacy concerns in 
the Smart Home ecosystem.  This study examined multiple intrusion vectors including 
wireless technologies and web/IP-based exploits.  Yin's (2014) case study construct was 
adopted to examine the applicability of exploratory research in the context of Smart 
Home ecosystems.  Finally, the work reported here relates to the Lockheed Martin 
Intrusion Kill Chain to actor-driven intrusions that have possible implications in the 
Smart Home ecosystem. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Results 
Introduction 
The Smart Home ecosystem described in Chapter 3 was observed using full data 
captures (packet captures or PCAPs) from the controlled environment using both a ninja 
star wiretap and Z-Wave USB dongle, both of which ultimately served as a data 
collection instrument in the three case studies described in Chapter 3.  The PCAP data for 
the wired network segment was captured using a windows version of Wireshark due to 
simplicity and system limitations pertinent to network settings and configurations.  The 
PCAP from the Z-Wave network was captured on Kali Linux version 2 using the Z-Wave 
  	 
 -	 (Fouladi & Ghanoun, 2013) in a virtual machine.  Both 
PCAPs were allowed to run while various Z-Wave devices executed tasks within their 
scope of capability.  Additionally, the PCAP collected notional periods where no activity 
should be occurring.  Periods of no activity were significant because the devices in the 
controlled environment initiated communications with outside sources while no activity 
in the Smart Home ecosystem was initiated by human activity.  This particular activity 
was closely examined to verify that no privacy information existed in the payload.   
This chapter is organized with a brief explanation of the sample demographics of 
the devices explored in this study followed by the final presentation and discussion of 
findings.  The final presentation and discussion of findings include case study one, which 
involved a survey of Z-Wave and Ethernet compliant communications, case study two, 
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which involved the analysis of Z-Wave and Ethernet vulnerabilities observed during the 
survey, and case study three, which involved the analysis of the Intrusion Kill Chain and 
a cross-examination of the preceding case studies.  The chapter is concluded with a 
summary of the findings and an introduction to the next chapter.  
Sample Demographics 
The controlled environment involved devices that were categorized as Smart 
Home devices.  The Smart Home devices evaluated presented the capacity to exhibit 
emergent object behavior.  The study examines not humans but devices in a controlled 
environment constructed from average consumer Smart Home equipment available on the 
market in 2015.  In the controlled environment, the nodes listed in Table 2 are configured 
with manufacturer recommended configurations and connected accordingly to the Smart 
Home ecosystem.  Each node was observed communicating with external addresses 
either through the ISP or through the cellular provider's data service.  Network traffic 
sensors were procured for the conduct of this study for packet capture capability for the 
single wired connection and for the sub-1GHz frequency Z-Wave connections that occur 
between the router, modem, and the Z-Wave control panel.  The router and the modem 
were configured with manufacturer recommended configurations for both wired and 
wireless connections, as applicable.  The Z-Wave control panel was configured by a 
Vivint technician and configured to their recommended standards. 
Presentation and Discussion of Findings 
RQ1 sought to determine how secure Smart Home technology IoT systems are 
independently. Because the Smart Home ecosystem designed in the present study 
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observed object traffic from two methods of communications (Z-Wave and Ethernet), 
CS1 is further explored from the Z-Wave and Ethernet perspectives.  
Z-Wave Compliant Communications (Case Study 1).  At a basic level, the Z-
Wave network architecture consists of a controller node and a slave node.  The controller 
node acts as the central hub that establishes the unique network identifier, the Home ID, 
which is repeated in the preamble of a slave node.  In the present study, the controller 
node for the Z-Wave network within the controlled Smart Home ecosystem is the 
wireless control panel, as described in Table 2.  During case study one (henceforth CS1), 
the controller node was observed initiating transmission to other slave nodes on the 
network.  As explained by McClure et al., (2015), communications from the wireless 
control panel are typically polling or updating slave nodes for health and maintenance of 
network routing topologies.  Responding to the controller node, as indicated by the Node 
ID observed during the packet capture, were the slave nodes, also described in Table 2.  
The slave nodes responded to the solicitations from the control node directly or indirectly 
from the subsequent re-solicitation from adjacent slave nodes.  Similar to IEEE 802.15.4 
compliant communications, the Z-Wave nodes observed during CS1 used a mesh-
networking model to compensate for a node-to-controller range communication failure, 
using positive acknowledgment and frame retransmission.  It was noted during CS1 that 
the Z-Wave communication network was self-forming and capable of routing dynamic 
network topology updates (McClure, Scambray, & Kurtz, 2015).  Further research into 
the Z-Wave structured protocol stack configuration helped elucidate how components 
relative to each node performed node-to-node and node-to-controller communications.  
The Z-Wave structured protocol stack is comprised of five layers, namely the physical, 
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media access control (MAC), transport, network, and the application layer (Fouladi & 
Ghanoun, 2013; McClure et al., 2015).  The physical layer performed physical 
connectivity tasks associated with channel assignment within the sub-1 GHz radio 
frequency (RF) modulation and synchronization.  The MAC layer of the structured 
protocol stack displayed the unencrypted Z-Wave Home ID and Node ID.  This layer was 
also capable of preventing collisions using device-specific unique Node ID's and collision 
avoidance algorithms.  The transport layer of the structured protocol stack performed the 
tasks specific to transmission and reception acknowledgment of frames, as observed 
during CS1 in the checksum values in the captured frames.  The network layer displayed 
the mesh topology updates and carried out inter-node frame routing, as appropriate, to the 
device location.  The network layer is also responsible for defining and allocating 
hierarchical device roles in the structured protocol stack, e.g., determining which device 
is designated as a controller or a slave.  The network layer definition and allocation 
process also associated the device Home ID and Node ID for network route 
establishment.  The network layer definition and allocation functionality are particular 
security concern given the concept of the Z-Wave node inclusion and exclusion process 
(McClure et al., 2015).  As Z-Wave devices are added to the network, physical access is 
required to the Z-Wave controller node to initiate the Z-Wave network 
inclusion/exclusion process.  The requirement for physical proximity for an authorized 
user is essential to maintaining a multifactor security defensive posture for the Z-Wave 
network.  Thus, cyber intruders would have to circumvent physical safeguards in order to 
include or exclude devices from the network.  The last hierarchal tier of the structured 
protocol stack is the application layer.  The application layer brokers the payloads of the 
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frames received and transmitted.  More specifically, the application layer parses and 
processes payload data, e.g., requests for topology updates and responses to inclusion 
requests.  As a part of CS1, the application layer payload data was closely observed to 
determine if unencrypted payload contents were routed outside the Z-Wave network via 
the Ethernet compliant communications.  McClure et al., (2015) made specific note that 
Z-Wave operates at a 3 75-foot range, contingent on the content and type of information 
required to be transmitted as well as the power source.  During the conduct of CS1, the 
effective distance was not confirmed due to a lack of specialized tools needed to 
accomplish sub-1 GHz ranging.  Nonetheless, it was confirmed that both the control and 
the slave nodes consistently listen for network topology updates to enhance the meshed 
infrastructure and further extend the network range, up to four hops (McClure et al., 
2015).  Range capability of the Z-Wave network is significant to this study, as security 
implications of specific node-to-node communication may expose pertinent device 
configuration details that may be of value to an attacker even if located at a considerable 
distance.  It was also observed during CS1 that battery-powered Z-Wave devices were 
not participants in topology updates to other nodes.  As suggested by McClure et al., 
(2015), battery-powered Z-Wave devices did not participate in forwarding topology 
changes as a battery conservation strategy (McClure et al., 2015).  During the conduct of 
CS1, the repeater node described in Table 2 was unplugged from the wall and the 
controller node was observed broadcasting topology updates to the remaining participant 
nodes.  Subsequently, once the repeater node was plugged back into the power source 
within the timeframe necessary to ensure that the node would not be disassociated from 
the network, the proper Home ID was broadcasted from the repeater node and the 
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controller node broadcasted additional topology updates to the remaining participant 
nodes.  As explained by McClure et al., (2015), a Z-Wave node was added to the network 
through the inclusion process explained above in the application layer portion of the Z-
Wave structured protocol stack.  The mechanics related to this process include the 
primary controller associating a Node ID to the device in the range between 1 and 232.  
Subsequently, Z-Wave nodes continued to use the Node ID value in all transmissions 
while still assigned within the Z-Wave network.  Thus, the Z-Wave network was limited 
to a maximum of 232 nodes (McClure et al., 2015).  
In CS1, the Z-Wave communications, observed using Z-Force, did display the 
Home ID and Node ID in plain text in the PCAP, as explained above, followed by 
encrypted payload data.  In the context of CS1, externally viewed conversations refer to 
the computer that was not associated with the Z-Wave Home ID and was able to capture, 
passively, the traffic from the Z-Wave network.  The internal communications were 
observed in the same manner, focusing on node-to-node specific communications and the 
content of the conversations.  Once any content was discovered from both the external 
view and the internal view, the traffic behavioral heuristics were generalized to explore 
the purpose of the conversation, and the results were recorded.  Table 6 provides 
generalized conversations that occurred during the packet capture.  The packet capture 
was terminated after 48 hours.  This limitation was imposed to ensure that adequate data 
would be captured to observe all sequences of communications possible from the 
participating devices, while also making the data set manageable from the analytical 
perspective.  From the Z-Wave PCAP, the activity of the entire content of the Z-Wave 
communications could be observed promiscuously, as shown in Table 6.    
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Table 6 
Case Study 1 Data Collection  
 
Node Externally Viewed 
Conversations 
Internal Viewed 
Conversations 
Payload 
Z-Wave Slave Node Promiscuous Z-Wave 
sniffing  
Home ID and Node ID 
(Encrypted Payload) Network topology updates 
Z-Wave Slave Node Promiscuous Z-Wave 
sniffing 
Home ID and Node ID 
(Encrypted Payload) Response to control node 
Z-Wave Control 
Node 
Promiscuous Z-Wave 
sniffing Home ID Network topology updates 
Z-Wave Control 
Node 
Promiscuous Z-Wave 
sniffing Home ID Response solicitation 
Z-Wave Control 
Node UDP OpenVPN Encrypted (TLS RSA) 
IP Fragmented and 
Encrypted 
Ethernet Compliant Communications (Case Study 1).  While the Z-Wave 
traffic was captured during the execution of CS1, Wireshark was used to capture all 
Ethernet compliant communications entering and exiting the controlled environment, as 
explained above.  None of the Z-Wave formatted traffic was visible from the wired 
packet capture; however, traffic originating from the Z-Wave wireless control panel was 
observed communicating with a Vivint server using an OpenVPN protocol during 
associated timestamps at which the Z-Wave network traffic was observed.  The Vivint 
server was identified by resolving the IP address captured during the Wireshark analysis 
   	 
      
     		  
correlation between the captured Ethernet communications and the observed Z-Wave 
activity was confirmed through the Internet Protocol (IP) fragmentation that occurred 
with correlated timestamps between the two network captures.  The OpenVPN protocol 
did encrypt the conversations originating internally to the Z-Wave network.  Thus, the 
theoretical concepts that support how the OpenVPN protocol achieves secure endpoint-
to-endpoint conversations is detailed when discussing kernel agnostic tunneling 
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architectures, UDP/TCP modes, encryption, public/private keys, and payloads later in this 
chapter.  The kernel agnostic tunneling architectures (e.g., TAPs and TUNs) refer to 
network devices supported entirely in software.  OpenVPN is a Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL)-based Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocol that makes use of the modern 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) as a method to secure endpoint connections (Crist & 
Keijser, 2015).  The operating system needed to run OpenVPN is agnostic because 
OpenVPN does not rely on operating system-specific kernel architecture due to the TAP 
and TUN devices organic to OpenVPN.  The TAP and TUN (explained below) devices 
foster the support for a variety of operating systems, including Linux, 
Free/Open/NetBSD, Solaris, AIX, Windows, Mac OS, and iOS/Android devices (Crist & 
Keijser, 2015).  However, all aforementioned operating systems still require the 
installation of client software, which in the case of CS1 was the Z-Wave wireless control 
panel and the Vivint application installed on the Android device initiating the commands 
to the Z-Wave network.  As a part of CS1, it was also observed that OpenVPN operates 
using a control channel and a data channel, both of which are encrypted using a custom 
encryption protocol (easy RSA as observed in CS1, see Table 6).  Moreover, all traffic 
was passed over a single UDP connection using the default OpenVPN protocol and UDP 
port 1194.  The TUN, as referenced above, is an abbreviation for TUNnel.  For 
OpenVPN to function, TUNs create a virtual network layer, with the capability to 
encapsulate and route layer-3 IP packets (Crist & Keijser, 2015).  TAPs, as referenced 
above, is an abbreviation for a network tap.  TAPs perform the task of virtualizing data 
link layer encapsulation (layer 2) for Ethernet frames, creating network bridges, 
facilitating collision avoidance and hardware address association (Crist & Keijser, 2015).  
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OpenVPN uses TAPs and TUNs to process the incoming and outgoing traffic as an 
application running on the OpenVPN client device.  While conducting CS1, it was noted 
that the encryption protocol OpenVPN was implementing TLS over UDP, as noted in 
Table 6.  TLS is a symmetric encryption technique that employs a uniquely generated key 
for each session that is negotiated through the control channel during the initiation of the 
session.  TLS also has the organic capability to support identity authentication using 
public-key cryptography.  The public and private key exchange process that occurred 
during the conduct of CS1 and during the IP fragmented sessions from the OpenVPN 
protocol took place when the TLS control channel VPN connection was being initiated.  
Key exchange was also observed during the exchange of new encryption keying material 
that, according to Crist and Keijser (2015), occurs after a predetermined time lapse.  The 
data channel public and private key exchange process are not negotiated; rather, they are 
stored in the client and server OpenVPN configuration files (Crist & Keijser, 2015).  
Finally, the OpenVPN data payloads employ hashing algorithms, such as SHA1, to help 
ensure the integrity of the packets delivered. 
The appropriateness of RQ1 in relation to the first case study and the case study 
framework establishes that Smart Home ecosystem devices are moderately secure 
independent of other devices on the network.  This assertion is made due to the fact that 
privacy information is visible using open source tools from a 75 feet standoff distance. 
Subsequently, the requirement for physical proximity to the Z-Wave controller nodes 
does help mitigate threat possibilities. The information gathered during CS1 is further 
evaluated in case study two. 
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Z-Wave Communications Vulnerabilities (Case Study 2).  RQ2 sought to 
determine what behavioral data exchange or aggregate device communication occurs 
between Smart Home objects that effect fundamental security levels. Because the Smart 
Home ecosystem designed in the present study observed object traffic from two methods 
of communications (Z-Wave and Ethernet), case study two is further explored from the 
Z-Wave and Ethernet vulnerabilities perspectives.  Thus, further research was conducted 
to explore the vulnerabilities observed during the execution of CS1.  As demonstrated in 
CS1, Z-Force can obtain frame-level visibility of the unencrypted Z-Wave data link, and 
network layers.  An attacker could execute a spoofing attack of an observed Node ID.  
This would allow the attacker to interact with other nodes over a Z-Wave network 
without alarming any physical safeguards organic to the Z-Wave network (Fouladi & 
Ghanoun, 2013). The Z-Wave proprietary protocol does offer an optional security layer, 
which is implemented at the application layer in the later generations of Z-Wave devices 
(McClure et al., 2015).  However, further security enhancements are subject to cost 
constraints, and the Z-Wave Alliance has not produced public documentation disclosing 
security mechanisms employed by Z-Wave devices (McClure et al., 2015).  The 
theoretical concepts that support how Z-Wave traffic employed encryption observed in 
CS1 revealed that the Z-Wave encryption methods make use of an AES-OFB (Advanced 
Encryption Standard - Output Feedback Mode) protocol (McClure et al., 2015).  The 
findings reported by Fouladi and Ghanoun (2013) confirm that the protocol 
implementation of the encryption and authentication methods as used by the Z-Wave 
AES-OFB is a vulnerability that could allow an attacker to reset the established network 
key on a target Z-Wave device.  This vulnerability arises mainly due to the lack of state 
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validation in the key exchange protocol handler programmed in the Z-Wave physical 
device (Fouladi & Ghanoun, 2013).   
Because the encryption and authentication methods are vulnerable on the Z-Wave 
network and the critical node membership information can be observed in plain text 
(Home ID and Node ID), a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack is possible for the Z-Wave 
network.  The Z-Wave member devices do not validate the identity of the controller, 
making it possible for valid commands from the controller to be intercepted during the 
inclusion process with a target device.  This vulnerability causes the unassociated Z-
Wave device to associate to a malicious Z-Wave controller (McClure et al., 2015). 
The encryption and authentication methods also expose the Z-Wave network to 
attacks due to the lack of confidentiality protection during the Key recovery delivery over 
the Z-Wave network.  The Key recovery key is a well-known character string that was 
passively observed during the inclusion process in the conduct of case study two 
(henceforth CS2) while using Z-Force.  This key could subsequently be used to decrypt 
and forge anomalous packets to the Z-Wave network (McClure et al., 2015). 
In CS2, the data collected from CS1 was analyzed to develop a custom Smart 
Home focused rule set from the open source Debian 7 based operating system network 
intrusion detection system (NIDS) solution (SNORT).  SNORT was first configured to 
alert on all traffic that matched community-rules profiles.  The purpose of proposing this 
tool was to explore the applicability of using SNORT to evaluate Z-Wave packet data.  
During the execution of CS2, SNORT was unable to parse the PCAP collected during 
CS1.  Thus, the development of a tool was proposed for multi-layer traffic behavioral 
data exchange and aggregate device communication occurring within a Smart Home 
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the Z-Wave structured protocol stack and would pass Z-Wave activity along to the 
metadata function.  The Z-Wave output would have the capability to send properly 
configured control and data channel commands to the Z-Wave network.  Overall, the Z-
Wave IO would serve the purpose of collecting and locally responding to anomalous 
events observed of the Z-Wave network.  The Ethernet TAP input would have the 
functionality of collecting Z-Wave conversations that traverse the Ethernet compliant 
communications to the ISP (see Ethernet traffic sensor shown in Figure 5).  Both wired 
and wireless inputs would need the functionality of a protocol analyzer containing the 
low-level protocol configurations and would have the capacity to configure the protocol 
mappings dynamically from the rule sets maintained by a Security as a Service (SECaaS) 
service provider.  The locally configured protocol mappings would contain a list of all 
known protocol states that is readily accessible from RAM.  The metadata function, 
depicted in blue, would be capable of deep packet inspection (DPI), as well as of 
decrypting OpenVPN TLS and Z-Wave payload traffic.  Here, the stateless logic, 
depicted in light gray, would be capable of verifying user activity against baseline 
signatures/heuristics (also called whitelisting).  Subsequently, the stateless logic, also 
depicted in light gray, would be capable of receiving rule set definitions from the 
dynamic rule set.  The dynamic rule set, also depicted in blue, would be a cloud-based 
solution (SECaaS) that is locally maintained for quick and fail-resistant communications 
with metadata functions.  Lightweight cryptography standards, depicted as encryption, 
are employed in this solution for ensuring that all Z-Wave IO and Ethernet compliant 
communications remain resilient to external attacks and intrusions.  Lastly, the swap file 
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is monitored via API locally for user level alerts and via SECaaS for an expeditious 
analytical response.  
The proposed solution will help establish the extent to which behavioral data 
exchange or aggregate device communication occurs between the IoT objects that effect 
fundamental security levels.  Table 7 summarizes the coding matrix that would notionally 
be collected from the proposed solution as IDS alerts trigger on external conversations 
from outside the network directed internally, as well as internal conversations from inside 
the network directed externally (bidirectional).  The relevant conversations were 
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configuration.  Once the Z-Wave Wireless Control Panel initiated conversations, the 
packet content was analyzed to determine if the Z-Wave network modification request 
matched the heuristics defined in the dynamic rule set.  If the alerts were triggered due to 
an anomalous device requesting membership to the Z-Wave network, the standard output 
would notify the user for immediate actions.  If the user failed to respond, the SECaaS 
service provider would have the culpability to address the issue and directly communicate 
with the Z-Wave network.  Table 7 helps illuminate node activity associations between 
Z-Wave traffic and IDS alert configurations.  It is also important to note that traffic 
observed outbound or inbound in the Smart Home ecosystem is encrypted to meet 
lightweight cryptography standards for publicly visible traffic. 
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As observed in CS2, and depicted in Figure 7, if an application or protocol is 
using UDP for configuration and cipher material negotiation, it is susceptible to message 
deletion or packet reordering attacks (Crist & Keijser, 2015).  The exception to this 
vulnerability is the pre-shared key point-to-point method using a custom easy RSA key, 
as explained above.  In the case of the OpenVPN conversations that were observed 
during CS2, only the data channel used this technique.  To avoid possible MitM attacks 
where server impersonation causes client(s) to attempt to connect an adjacent client(s), 
server certificate verification must be instituted by clients (OpenVPN_Technologies, 
2013).   
As depicted in Table 7    	-
    trigger due to an 
anomalous device intercepting the Ethernet compliant communications tampering with 
the IP fragmentation from the ISP network.  Subsequently, the standard output would 
notify the user for immediate actions.  If the user failed to respond, the SECaaS service 
provider would have the capability to address the issue and directly communicate with 
the Z-Wave network.   
The appropriateness of RQ2 in relation to CS2 and the case study framework 
establishes that Smart Home ecosystem devices are not secure when behavioral data 
exchange or aggregate device communication occurs between Smart Home objects that 
effect fundamental security levels.  This assertion is made due to the fact the Z-Wave 
AES-OFB perpetuates a vulnerability that could allow an attacker to reset the negotiated 
key between a target Z-Wave device and a Z-Wave controller.  Furthermore, the 
requirement for an RSA key, during the OpenVPN conversations is exclusive to the data 
channel conversations on the Ethernet communications in the Smart Home ecosystem.  
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The lack of a control channel RSA key subjects Ethernet compliant communications to 
possible MitM attacks and does not help mitigate threat possibilities. The theoretical 
concepts supporting how CS2 was executed for both Z-Wave and Ethernet traffic 
observations prompted the need for the proposed solution, as it helps establish the extent 
to which behavioral data exchange or aggregate device communication occurs between 
the IoT objects that influence fundamental security levels. The information gathered 
during CS2 is further evaluated in case study three. 
Kill Chain Analysis (Case Study 3).  RQ3 sought to explore the emergent 
security issues related to Smart Home object behavior that affects personal safety relating 
to cyber security, resilience to cyber threats, and personally identifiable information from 
the collection of object usage data.  CS1 demonstrated that a cyber intrusion was possible 
in the Intrusion Kill Chain categories of reconnaissance and weaponization, as shown in 
Table 1.  In previous studies related to Z-Wave security, the researchers demonstrated the 
effectiveness of using the Z-Force tool to perform actor-driven efforts to discover 
generalized information about a potential victim (Fouladi & Ghanoun, 2013).  The 
methods proposed by Fouladi and Ghanoun (2013) were replicated during the conduct of 
this study.  The Z-Force tool and the ninja star Ethernet TAP represent reconnaissance 
phase activities require     	

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network.  Conclusions are drawn to assist in determining whether the victim's technology 
in use is susceptible to specific attack vectors.  The weaponization phase occurs when the 
attacker customizes attack vectors, e.g., executes a spoofing attack of an observed Node 
ID.  This would help the attacker's computer to interact with other nodes over a Z-Wave 
network without alarming any physical safeguards organic to the Z-Wave network.  
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Because Z-Wave traffic could be observed without the physical access inside the Smart 
Home ecosystem, attackers could be up to 75 feet away from the home to observe Z-
Wave architecture without range-extending wireless tools.  This would allow the attacker 
both standoff distance and the necessary time to construct tools unique to the Z-Wave 
architecture.  The attacker could weaponize packet data that would be capable of 
executing MitM attacks or key recovery attacks, as described above.  Delivery would 
occur when the infrastructure is physically connecting the attacker (or attacker's 
architecture) to the victim (or victim's architecture) transmits the weaponized function.  
The proposed solution outlined above would aid in detecting multi-layer traffic 
behavioral data exchange and aggregate device communication during the delivery and 
exploitation, thus illuminating successful manipulation of a particular vulnerability using 
the weaponized function.  Subsequently, the proposed solution will alert, via standard out 
or via SECaaS, of any weaponized function installs or subsequent calls to implant 
instructions on the victim's network.  The aim of conducting case study three (henceforth 
CS3), was to identify the emergent security issues related to Smart Home object behavior 
that adversely affects personal safety relating to cyber security, resilience to cyber threats, 
and personally identifiable information (PII) when confidential information is resident in 
the Smart Home ecosystem.  During the conduct of CS3, analysis of the IDS 
configuration based on the solution proposed in CS2 was used to identify internal or 
external Smart Home conversations.  The proposed IDS configuration identified internal 
and external Smart Home encrypted traffic in the packet payload, as noted in Table 8.  
The IDS configuration analysis identified conversations that contain PII, along with 
nodes responding to vulnerability scans.  The two main areas of focus for the proposed 
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solution pertained to the wireless control panel and the Z-Wave member devices, as they 
communicated externally via the ISP, as shown in Figure 7 and Table 8. Control over the 
Smart Home devices that establish point-to-point conversations with internal or external 
nodes that are transmitting PII or vulnerability data as a payload is mitigated by the 
proposed solution's user and SECaaS alerts.  User and SECaaS provider's response to 
alerts also mitigates risks associated with the attacker infrastructure establishment during 
the command and control phase and the final phase activities. 
Table 8 
Case Study 3 Data Collection  
 
Node  Signature Payload PII Vulnerabilities Controls 
Wireless 
Control 
Panel 
Trigger on 
Unassociated 
Device 
requesting Z-
Wave 
membership 
Unencrypted Yes  Yes  
User 
verification 
of activity  
Any Z-
Wave 
device 
Trigger on 
unencrypted 
traffic 
Encrypted yes yes 
User 
verification 
of activity 
 
The appropriateness of RQ3 in relation to CS3 and the case study framework 
establishes that Smart Home ecosystem presents emergent security issues related to 
Smart Home object behavior that concerns personal safety relating to cyber security, 
resilience to cyber threats, and personally identifiable information. This assertion is made 
due to personally identifiable information traversing internal and external to the Smart 
home ecosystem in plain text.  The use of the proposed solution does help mitigate 
associated threats identified in RQ3.   
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Summary of Findings 
When interpreting the findings yielded by the present study, it is essential to 
acknowledge their lack of generalizability to every Smart Home ecosystem configuration, 
Smart Home device, or ISP communications with the Smart Home ecosystem.  The 
research conducted in this study presented the analysis of CS1, CS2, and CS3.  CS1 
presented the analysis of Z-Wave and Ethernet compliant communications.  The analysis 
of CS1 involved the passive capture of Z-Wave and Ethernet compliant communications 
and the presentation and further research of the observations.  CS2 presented the analysis 
of Z-Wave and Ethernet vulnerabilities using SNORT.  The Z-Wave and Ethernet 
vulnerabilities were not fully explored due to a capability gap, which identified that 
accurate correlation between the captured Ethernet communications and the observed Z-
Wave activity is not currently possible without the proposed solution.  In addition, it 
should be emphasized that the proposed tool designed for deep packet inspection capable 
of decrypting OpenVPN TLS and Z-Wave payload traffic would follow the logic 
described above and would be capable of verifying user activity against white-listed 
baseline signatures/heuristics.  CS3 presented the analysis of the Intrusion Kill Chain and 
a cross-examination of the preceding case studies.  CS3 also investigated the practical use 
of the proposed solution as an effort to mitigate the transmission of PII or vulnerability 
specific data in/outbound to the Smart Home ecosystem.  Chapter 5 presents conclusions 
drawn from the data presented in chapter 4.  The present study offers viable solutions and 
recommendations for enhanced security practices in the use of Smart Home technology.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Findings and Conclusion 
Smart Home ecosystems are seen as the next step in the computing age evolution.  
Owing to their reliance on platforms that integrate and aggregate ubiquitous sensors and 
devices with a variety of communication protocols, Smart Home ecosystems are 
empowered by cloud technology and make the devices consumers use on a daily basis 
more intelligent and thus more beneficial.  In the Smart Home, the resident is safer due to 
on-demand communications to local emergency responders, the mobility-impaired 
individuals are more independent, and countless others are expected to benefit from the 
almost limitless possibilities that will likely emerge as the technology becomes more 
widespread.  However, as modern society progresses technologically, so do the ability of 
those who wish to perpetuate harm, to steal, or to exploit the innocent.  The aim of the 
present study was to explore the current vulnerabilities in the emerging Smart Home 
ecosystem and identify patterns cyber attackers would exploit to inflict nefarious actions.  
The case studies presented in this thesis were designed and conducted in order to evaluate 
the Smart Home ecosystem by applying two prominent methods of inter- and intra-
communication technologies Ethernet compliant communications and Z-Wave 
compliant communications. 
The problem this study sought to address is the gap in knowledge consumers have 
concerning vulnerabilities within IoT devices given recent trends of accelerated and the 
regular purchase of smart technology.  This study offered a qualitative exploratory 
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research with the purpose of investigating Smart Home technology vulnerabilities within 
a real life context of the IoT typical usage applications.  Moreover, this study was 
purposed to characterize average Smart Home device usage in contrast to acceptable and 
nefarious data heuristic behaviors.  Subsequently, SNORT and the proposed solution 
contrasted data behavior and illuminated anomalous datalink traffic and payloads.  
Finally, real-time Smart Home traffic was evaluated for the propensity to be vulnerable 
and disclose personally identifiable information (PII) through exploring current and 
proposed solutions in a controlled Smart Home ecosystem environment.  The information 
obtained during the course of this study involved the systematic acquisition and analysis 
of Smart Home ecosystem link-layer PDUs.  The methodology employed during this 
study involved a recursive multiple case study evaluation of the Smart Home ecosystem 
data-link layer PDUs and aligned the case studies to the existing Intrusion Kill Chain 
design model.  The proposed solution emerging from the case studies builds the 
appropriate data collection template while concurrently developing a SECaaS capability 
to evaluate collected results.  The ethical implications during the conduct of this study 
involved limited human participation.  The only exception was the possible disclosure of 
information about the researcher's Smart Home ecosystem that could be repurposed 
nefariously.  To mitigate the possibilities of personal information disclosure, appropriate 
efforts were made to mask the data collected containing specific ISP information.  The 
vulnerabilities discovered were generalized to the function of the specific node as the 
individual node relates to the overall Smart Home ecosystem.  Collateral networks were 
discovered in proximity to the controlled environment.  However, the collateral networks 
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were not reported in the final analysis of the data, as the collateral networks did not 
impede any instruments used in the conduct of this study. 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions from the as appropriate to the conduct of all 
three case studies.  The findings and conclusions present solutions to mitigate Smart 
Home technology vulnerabilities discovered during the conduct of this study, the 
limitations of the study, the implications for practice, the implications inferred from the 
conduct of this study, and the recommendations for future research. Finally, this chapter 
is surmised with the overall generalizations found during the conduct of this study.   
The sensors used to control smart technology gather data. It is thus advised that 
users seek the necessary information regarding the types of data the devices used in the 
context of a Smart Home ecosystem generates (Widman, 2015).  Because of increased 
risks of unauthorized access, users need to consider sensor orientation when sensors are 
utilized in the home.  According to Widman (2015), it was possible to monitor homes 
remotely through video cameras already installed in the home.  In fact, in this study, the 
author assessed ten security systems, reporting that all tested systems were affected by 
this particular issue.  Not only was it possible to watch the home, but also obtain 
information as to whether or not the home was vacant.  Therefore, users need to amplify 
the security features of the devices.  In fact, the insecure defaults of the systems are 
considered one of the major problems related to these devices.  As a result, default 
passwords need to be changed and the new ones made sufficiently strong by using lower 
and upper case letters, numbers, and symbols to increase security.  Keeping networks 
separate is an adequate resolution to protect personal data on phones and PCs.  In 
addition, each network should have a separate password to protect the connected home 
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devices from hackers in the event of an intrusion (Widman, 2015).  Furthermore, network 
segmentation is necessary.  Another useful option is to hide the network or make it 
invisible to allow the associated Wi-Fi network to be discovered by automatic searching.  
As a result of this configuration, in order to use this network, users would be required to 
know the name, enhancing security.  As mentioned above, other threats originate outside 
the proximity of the home, typically from open ports in the IP construct (Kong, Tian, 
Pan, Liu, & Wu, 2013).  Remote communication channels are established between 
remote maintenance servers and the devices in the home, allowing the consumer, the 
Smart Home service provider, and the Smart Home manufacturers, but also potential 
attackers, to communicate with the specific devices.  The most obvious solution to this 
issue is to turn off the communication channels.  Unfortunately, it is presently possible to 
manipulate communication channels to an attacker's desired state.  Additionally, users are 
typically limited to reduced functionalities when devices are powered off.  There are 
other solutions to this problem, such as re-sequencing of the more common ports 
(obfuscation) to other ports and/or creating a pseudo port-based encryption at the point of 
entry for the device/home (Agrawal & Sohi, 2012).  In simple terms, re-sequencing will 
deny a straight-line communication channel to a  	 devices/home.  Finally, as 
with all devices that communicate across networks, a so-called zero-day threat is always 
present (Bambauer, 2013).  These are unforeseen threats, for which no solution can be 
provided in advance.  While this deficiency is inevitable, whenever issues emerge, there 
are learning opportunities that help advance the given field.  Thus, networks are still 
thriving and are overcoming threats and vulnerabilities by quickly identifying emergent 
issues and researching the solution.  
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Limitations of the Study 
The study conducted cannot be generalized to all that own technology because it 
did not include all types of technology.  As executed, this study is generalized only to 
those that own smart technology that is similar to the devices evaluated.  The study also 
accounts for the generalization of the knowledge level of those that own smart 
technology by fully explaining the specific tools required to address the full potential and 
implications existent given multiple proprietary vulnerabilities.  The generalization of the 
knowledge level is done to acknowledge the existence of tools that can circumvent 
encryption levels that are    	

	   
	  


  
conduct this study.  Thus, the vulnerabilities discovered, the systems used, and the tools 
incorporated in this study are limited to a moderately capable desktop computer running 
Windows 10 and the tools required to observe traffic on the networks falling within the 
scope of this study.  
Implications for Practice 
The NIST standards and guidelines offer potential approaches to mitigating 
security and privacy concerns in the IoT (Hogan & Newton, 2015).  NIST validates the 
requirements for the solution proposed in this study by offering the challenge of 
developing lightweight cryptography standards that meet the demands of the IoT 
hardware constraints (Hogan & Newton, 2015).  NIST guidelines emphasize the 
importance of security and privacy in the IoT and differentiate their unique requirements 
from traditional hardware and software designs for desktop/server environments.  It is 
also postulated that advanced cryptography would be the most effective means of 
enhancing the security posture of Smart Home ecosystems.  Given a sufficiently strong 
104 
 
encryption sequence, interconnected device communication, and susceptible systems, 
internal Smart Home device Z-Wave and Ethernet traffic would become exponentially 
more resilient to external attacks and intrusions.   
Jajodia,    	
 2005) recommended that security installers disable 
port forwarding to reduce alarm system susceptibility 
    	
 
.  
Concurring with this view, some authors argue that port forwarding is not needed because 
it exposes vulnerabilities unnecessarily.  Jajodia et al. (2005) also recommended 
installing a virtual private network (VPN), which provides users with secure, encrypted 
tunnels (Jajodia et al., 2005).  These tunnels allow the user to visit the desired site safely 
and securely.  Many experts also recommend that the home PC have a separate network 
than the connected devices in the Smart Home.  It is expected that home security and 
automation systems will experience more vulnerabilities due to the migration from IPv4 
to IPv6.  The purpose of these protocols is to carry communications in the form of 
Internet traffic from endpoint to endpoint.  With the emergence of IPv6, ubiquitous 
devices can be interconnected conveniently from endpoint to endpoint, increasing Smart 
Home mainstream applicability.  Given IPv6's greater address space, ubiquitous devices 
can possess unique IPv6 address and subsequently configure themselves automatically 
when connected to an IPv6 network using dynamic address auto-configuration protocols 
(Liu, Yang, Chen, & Pan, 2014).  Therefore, those planning the use of Smart Home 
technology need to be aware of hacking concerns as well.  Although each Smart Home 
technology uses similar concepts, each of these systems has the same type of architecture, 
resulting in similar vulnerabilities.  According to one hacker (King, 2015), the firmware 
is considered the brains of a device.  Firmware is instrumental in remotely pointing the 
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device to an update provided by a hacker.  Cyber intrusions that are extensive enough to 
manipulate device firmware allow the hacker to compromise the device without the 
victim being aware of such an intrusion, causing the device to be useless to the victim; 
such approaches are often referred to as a rootkit.  Some Smart Home manufacturers 
insist that vulnerabilities be part of the design.  These same manufacturers argue that 
consumers wanted the vulnerabilities to remain to run custom scripts and plug-ins.  Other 
IoT vendors have products with built-in security bugs that are similar.  Therefore, these 
exposures can be combated by simply requiring that manufacturers install security 
compliant firmware, while also mandating verification of application codes.  These 
security considerations are important in light of the fact that there are 25 vulnerabilities in 
a common device, causing approximately 75% of those presently in use to be vulnerable 
to hacking at any given moment (King, 2015). 
It is debatable whether or not the market is prepared to defend devices using the 
necessary resources or should apply similar (or the same) safeguards and standards used 
with computers (Bartik, 2015).  These issues pertain to all types of smart technology and 
are not unique to Smart Homes.  However, the connected house is expected to become 
the norm, as technology continues to advance to provide smarter capabilities.  The 
mainstream is embracing Smart Home technology.  For instance, according to one 
survey, by 2019, over two-thirds of consumers will purchase smart devices.  Although no 
standard security recommendations presently exist as the Smart Home technology is new, 
protection can be attained by utilizing solutions for security issues.  For example, security 
can be improved using password manager software and mobile data security.  Once these 
solutions are leveraged, greater involvement in the groundwork security is expected, 
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benefitting the future users by protecting their privacy.  The obvious strategy is to 
password-protect devices, as this assists in preventing tracking (Hill, 2012).  Another 
effective option is to encrypt devices.  Encryption is essential because it has been argued 
that Smart Home technology mirrors the capabilities of a tiny computer (Widman, 2015).  
Moreover, according to Hewlett-Packard, many of the currently available home security 
systems are particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping on communications. 
Implications of Study and Recommendations for Future Research 
Many of the vulnerabilities confirmed in this study have been discovered in 
previous practitioner demonstrations. However, little information exists exploring the 
consolidated risks that emerge when proprietary system interact with one another with 
little to no security standards for communications.  Currently, there are no off the shelf 
devices that offer the level of analytics needed to combat active cyberspace security 
events. Furthermore, the resource constrained consumer technologies or the Smart home 
ecosystem, lacks both the infrastructure and architecture to prevent active cyberspace 
security events.  This study explored and proposed the development of a system that has 
the capability to learn Smart home ecosystem baseline configurations.  The hardware 
based solution outlined and recommended in this study requires future attention as it 
would present an appropriate level of visibility to detect and alert Smart Home users of 
the occurrence of rogue nodes and anomalous devices.  Ideally, a hybrid of a 
hardware/software/cloud-based solution would offer behavioral heuristics analysis, using 
checksums similar to the TCP protocol, that is continuously monitored by a SECaaS 
provider.  The system solution outlined and proposed in this study should be aligned at 
the gateways of the Smart Home Ecosystem to alert and identify success and failure of 
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node member authentication to the Z-Wave network.   Future research should include 
methods that can be employed to adequate encryption home ID visibility, whereas traffic 
transmitted in the sub-1GHz frequency range is not readily observed using  conventional 
tools e.g. protocol analyzers  Wireshark and Z-Force. Future research should include the 
testing of encryption strength of traffic that goes to the ethernet compliant networks from 
the Z-Wave wireless gateway. Future research should include a quantitative assessment 
of the systems mentioned in this study of how many consumers understand security 
implications contained within this study. This would determine if the systems in use from 
various Smart Home providers have inherent vulnerabilities or flaws that expose 
consumers to unacceptable levels where PII concerns are not mitigated, and 
vulnerabilities are not mitigated.    
Conclusion 
IoT expands the reach of technology and provides the means for the physical 
world to derive its characteristics from the cyberspace domain.  Smart Home technology 
is merely a subset of the IoT, as it is currently limited to the items that make life at home 
more intelligent.  The IoT and IoE make the world more communal and our interactions 
with it more intelligent, while also rendering the tasks we are required to perform on a 
daily basis more receptive to human behavioral heuristics.  The ever-growing security 
concerns are not a phenomenon that can be ignored in the home.  Solutions to the security 
implication in the home require innovative thinking, more collaborative development, 
and combative complacency that postures future generations in an Internet where 
everything personal and vulnerable is preserved from cyber incursions.   
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